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Foreword
T
hinking on development has long held that agricultural growth is an important step to-
ward economic development and transformation. However, the new challenges facing 
African agriculture in today’s more globalized environment have led some to question 
whether conventional wisdom about the role of agriculture in development is still applicable 
to Africa. There is a shift in emphasis toward nonagricultural growth opportunities, which has 
the potential to reshape the development strategies of many African countries over the coming 
decades.
  This research report critically examines conventional wisdom and contemporary skepti-
cism. It also develops a country typology reflecting the diversity of conditions across the 
subcontinent and then examines the role of agriculture in five African countries. The findings 
indicate that, in many African countries, only agriculture has sufficient scale to increase eco-
nomic growth significantly over the foreseeable future. Agricultural growth is also more ef-
fective at reducing poverty, even in countries that may have the potential for industrial growth 
driven by rich natural resources. Within the agricultural sector, there are few countries that 
can generate broad-based growth without expanding the food-staple and livestock subsectors. 
Based on these findings, the report concludes that although African agriculture faces many 
new challenges, agriculture and its food subsector cannot be bypassed if Africa is to experi-
ence broad-based economic growth and poverty reduction. 
  Agricultural growth in Africa needs significant increases in public and private investments, 
and the costs of generating growth can differ significantly across agriculture’s subsectors. The 
report is silent about such costs, which inevitably play an important role in informing develop-
ment strategies. Nevertheless, the findings of this report will contribute to strategic thinking 
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his report provides a nuanced perspective on debates about the potential for Africa’s 
smallholder agriculture to stimulate growth and alleviate poverty in an increasingly in-
tegrated world. In particular, the report synthesizes both the traditional theoretical and 
empirical literature on the role of agriculture in the development process and discusses more 
recent literature that reflects skepticism about the development potential of agriculture for Af-
rica. To examine in greater detail the relevance for Africa of both the “old” and “new” litera-
tures on agriculture, the report provides a typology of African countries based on their stage 
of development, agricultural conditions, natural resources, and geographic location. This ty-
pology highlights that the growth and poverty-reduction potential of agriculture varies sub-
stantially across the continent. Moreover, the typology provides the framework for in-depth 
analysis of agriculture and growth–poverty linkages in five countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Zambia) via economywide, macro–micro linkage models.
  The report shows that despite recent skepticism, agricultural growth is still important for 
most low-income African countries. The empirical analysis in the various country case studies 
finds that the pro-growth and pro-poor performance of agriculture will continue to depend on 
the broad participation of smallholder farmers, and that food staple growth generates more 
poverty reduction than other agricultural subsectors do. In an increasingly globalized world, 
however, African farmers face new and different challenges than those encountered by Asian 
and Latin American countries during their successful transformations. The ability of African 
farmers to find pathways out of poverty and to contribute actively to the growth process de-
pends on improving infrastructure and education, distributing key technologies and inputs, 
and promoting producer and marketing organizations that link small farmers to new market 
chains. African farmers cannot overcome these constraints on their own, and there is a need 
in the short term for greater public sector involvement in many African countries than is cur-
rently fashionable. The challenge is therefore to develop new institutional arrangements between 
the public and private sectors that foster private sector development without leaving small-




he majority of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lives in rural areas, where poverty 
and deprivation are most severe. Since almost all rural households depend directly or 
indirectly on agriculture, and given the large contribution of the sector to the overall 
economy, one might expect agriculture to be a key component of growth and development. 
However, whereas agriculture-led growth played an important role in slashing poverty and 
transforming the economies of many Asian and Latin American countries, the same has not 
occurred in Africa.1 Most African countries have not yet met the criteria for a successful agri-
cultural revolution, and factor productivity in African agriculture lags far behind the rest of 
the world. This failure has led to growing skepticism in the international development com-
munity about the relevance of agriculture to growth and poverty reduction. In this report we 
review and empirically examine this debate and find that the “agro-pessimism” not only is 
unwarranted but may also undermine attempts to accelerate growth and poverty reduction. 
Although parts of Africa are indeed disadvantaged by unfavorable natural and geographic 
conditions, the poor performance of agriculture has often been due to underinvestment in 
physical, institutional, and human capital. 
  This report examines whether the conventional wisdom on agriculture’s role in the develop-
ment process is applicable to the contemporary circumstances faced by most African countries. 
In particular, in Chapter 2 we analyze how the perceived role of agriculture in development 
has evolved over the past half century. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest 
that agricultural growth has powerful leverage effects on the rest of the economy, especially 
in the early stages of economic transformation, when it accounts for large shares of national 
income, employment, and exports. Through its linkages to the rest of the economy, agriculture 
can generate patterns of development that are employment intensive and favorable for the poor. 
However, although agriculture is generally an important component for Africa’s development, 
its ability to generate growth and reduce poverty varies across and within countries, as well 
as across different agricultural subsectors. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 we present a typology of 
African countries classified according to the potential for agriculture to contribute to growth, 
supplemented with in-depth case studies that examine agriculture, growth, and poverty dynam-
ics in Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia. Despite having different initial condi-
tions, the case studies found that broad-based agricultural growth, particularly in conjunction 
with growth in the nonagricultural sector, can contribute significantly to growth and poverty 
reduction. Furthermore, within agriculture it is growth in the food staples subsector that gener-
ates the greatest reduction in poverty, particularly within countries’ poorest subregions. Although 
1“Africa” refers to “Sub-Saharan Africa,” which is the regional focus of this report.2   CHAPTER  1
important achievements have occurred in 
these countries, generating further agricul-
tural growth to transform their economies 
will require meeting a number of condi-
tions, such as increased investments in tech-
nology, infrastructure, markets, and health, 
as well as improved governance. Chapter 4 




Conventional Wisdom and Current Debate
Agriculture’s Role in Early Development Thinking
S
ince agriculture constitutes a large share of national output and employs a majority of 
the labor force in most developing countries, the sector has been integral to any think-
ing about development.2 However, the perceived role of agriculture in growth and de-
velopment has changed considerably over the past half-century. Early classical theory viewed 
economic development as a growth process requiring the systematic reallocation of factors of 
production from a primary sector characterized by low productivity, traditional technology, 
and decreasing returns to a modern industrial sector with higher productivity and increasing 
returns (Adelman 2001). Agriculture was seen as a low-productivity, traditional sector that 
only passively contributed to development by providing food and employment. Furthermore, 
the importance of agriculture was expected to decline as development advanced. Nevertheless, 
agricultural growth was still considered necessary for development and for a country’s trans-
formation from a traditional to a modern economy. 
  Two key characteristics of agriculture during the early stages of development justified its 
place in early development thinking. First, agriculture produces goods that directly satisfy basic 
human needs. Second, agricultural production combines human effort with natural resources, 
such as land and agroecological assets. Early development theorists believed that, since natural 
resources were assumed to be freely available, agriculture could grow independently of other 
economic activities. However, in reality, the dependence of agriculture on a fixed supply of 
land meant that its expansion was constrained, implying that agricultural output cannot pro-
portionally increase with increased labor supply under a given technology (that is, agriculture 
suffers from diminishing returns). On the demand side, the need to satisfy basic needs implied 
that, at the very least, agricultural growth must match population growth to avoid the “Mal-
thusian trap” and stagnant development.
  Classical theorists observed that most developing countries comprise “dual’ economies. 
In this view, labor productivity is lower in agriculture than in industry, and hence develop-
ment requires the movement of agricultural labor into nonagricultural sectors. While it was 
assumed that nonagricultural innovation and technological change occurred independently of 
the agricultural sector, both labor and savings had to be released from agriculture to satisfy 
labor demand and finance capital investment in industry. This assumption explains “why 
2Agriculture accounts for more than 30 percent of GDP and 60 percent of total employment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, excluding South Africa (World Bank 2003a). 4   CHAPTER  2
industrial and agrarian revolutions always 
go together and why economies in which ag-
riculture is stagnant do not show industrial 
development” (Lewis 1954).3 Furthermore, 
the failure of demand for agricultural goods 
to keep pace with per capita income growth 
(that is, Engel’s law) implies that agricultural 
surpluses can be generated as long as ag-
ricultural productivity growth exceeds the 
population growth rate. The observation of 
classical theorists that agricultural surpluses 
are needed to finance the capital necessary 
for industrial development still remains im-
portant today, because, in spite of the recent 
liberalization of capital markets, investment 
in most countries still depends primarily on 
domestic savings (Ventura 1997).
  Beyond the role of agriculture in provid-
ing a “reserve army” of labor and capital to 
industries, classical economists also em-
phasized the importance of food supplies 
in sustaining economic growth. If traditional 
agriculture remained stagnant, then increased 
employment in the nonagricultural sector 
would lead to food shortages. Food price 
increases would raise the cost of living, 
especially for low-income households with 
high food consumption shares (that is, large 
Engel coefficients).4 The resulting pressure 
to raise wages would then hamper industrial 
growth, especially during the early stages of 
development when technologies are typi-
cally labor intensive. Increased labor costs 
would eventually drive the economy into a 
stationary state without further growth (see 
Box 2.1). This is the famous “Ricardian trap” 
(Ricardo 1817), which formed the foundation 
for subsequent development theorists (Schultz 
1953; Lewis 1954; Fei and Ranis 1961, 1964; 
Jorgenson 1961). According to Hayami (2001: 
84), these theorists understood that “suc-
cessful industrialization cannot be expected 
without the parallel effort of increasing food 
production to avoid the danger of being 
caught in the Ricardian trap.”
  Although early development economists 
saw agricultural growth as an essential com-
ponent and even a precondition for growth 
in the rest of economy, the process by which 
this growth was generated remained beyond 
the concern of most development econo-
mists (Ruttan 2002). For this reason,   Lewis’s 
theory was employed to support the indus-
trialization strategies adopted by many de-
veloping countries between the 1950s and 
1970s. The governments of many of these 
countries tried to accelerate the industrial-
ization process by heavily taxing agricul-
ture both directly and indirectly until the 
1980s (Schiff and Valdez 1992). However, 
3The observation that few countries have managed to develop without agricultural growth has been asserted 
repeatedly throughout the literature (see Lipton 2004).
4Open economies may use imports to overcome a food shortage, but historically this has been limited to entrepôt 
city-states such as Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Box 2.1  Food Availability Can Become a Constraint on Economic Growth
Latin American countries experienced rapid industrialization between the 1950s and 
1970s. Agricultural growth barely matched rising food demand caused by high population 
growth and urbanization. Industrial growth rose to 8 percent per year during 1965–73, 
while per capita agricultural production stagnated and even fell in five countries. As a re-
sult, food imports increased from an annual growth rate of 3.1 percent during the 1950s 
to more than 12 percent in the early 1970s. With a rise in world prices for grains, food 
imports led to substantial strains on the balance of trade and the exchange rate and led 
to inflationary pressures (de Janvry 1981).AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: CONVENTIONAL WIDSOM AND CURRENT DEBATE      5
as discussed later, the “urban bias” gener-
ated by these attempts at industrialization 
revealed that agricultural and nonagricultural 
growth could not occur independently of 
each other.
The Active Role of 
Agriculture in Growth 
and Development 
The view that agriculture plays only a pas-
sive role in development was swept aside by 
the dynamism of the green revolution in Asia 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
transformation of traditional agriculture into 
a modern sector revealed the potential of 
agriculture as a growth sector (see Box 2.2). 
Simultaneously, it highlighted that science-
based technology adapted to a country’s 
ecological conditions is fundamental for ag-
ricultural growth. Indeed, advances in me-
chanical and biological technology helped 
overcome endowment constraints, particu-
larly in regard to land and labor. Based on 
this idea, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) es-
poused an “induced innovation model” that 
not only emphasized the importance of tech-
nical change for agricultural growth but also 
stressed that technical change is often en-
dogenous to a country’s economic system. 
In other words, successful agricultural in-
novation is a dynamic process that reflects 
natural endowments; the degree of demand 
and supply for agricultural inputs and out-
puts; and the incentive structure for farmers, 
scientists, and the public and private sectors. 
As both the green revolution and the in-
duced innovation model revealed, agricul-
tural productivity growth requires fostering 
the linkages between the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors. Growth in agricul-
ture therefore does not occur independently 
of that in nonagricultural sectors, as theo-
rists had originally supposed. 
  The importance of intersectoral linkages 
in driving the growth process had already 
been recognized. Hirschman (1958) was one 
of the first theorists to emphasize linkage 
effects in the growth process, although his 
analysis focused on the backward and for-
ward linkages created by investments in 
industrial sectors. By contrast, Johnson and 
Mellor (1961) emphasized the existence of 
production and consumption linkages, both 
within agriculture as well as between agri-
cultural and nonagricultural sectors. Agricul-
tural production generates forward produc-
tion linkages when agricultural outputs are 
supplied as inputs to nonagricultural pro-
duction. Agricultural growth can therefore 
contribute to expanding agroprocessing and 
processed food marketing, which provide 
new engines of growth and opportunities to 
substitute for imports. Agriculture also cre-
ates backward production linkages through 
its demand for intermediate inputs such as 
fertilizers and marketing services. Both of 
these production linkages are likely to deepen 
Box 2.2  Agriculture Accounts for More than Half of GDP Growth between 1960 
and 1990
Work by Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002) shows the importance of agriculture 
during the early stages of development. Using both cross-sectional and panel data for 
62 developing countries for the period 1960 to 1990, the authors found that growth in 
agricultural productivity is quantitatively important in explaining growth in GDP per 
worker. This direct contribution accounts for 54 percent of GDP growth. Further, coun-
tries experiencing increases in agricultural productivity are able to release labor from 
agriculture into other sectors of the economy. This sectoral shift accounts for a further 
29 percent of GDP growth. The remaining 17 percent is derived from nonagricultural 
growth.6   CHAPTER  2
as an economy modernizes, but decline in 
relative importance alongside agriculture’s 
share of production (Haggblade, Hazell, and 
Brown 1989). 
  The consumption linkages generated by 
increased rural incomes is the strongest link-
age of agriculture in the development pro-
cess (Thirtle, Piesse, and Lin 2003; also see 
Box 2.3). Rural households, especially dur-
ing the early stages of development, provide 
an important market for domestically pro-
duced manufactures and services (Hazell 
and Roell 1983). Without this market, there 
are unlikely to be sufficient export opportu-
nities to allow fledgling domestic industries 
to achieve competitive efficiency in foreign 
markets through economies of scale. 
  Surplus agricultural income provides 
savings for investment in both urban and 
rural areas (Hart 1998). This savings link-
age also works through forward linkages to 
urban areas. Lower food prices, stimulated 
by technological change in agriculture, main-
tain low real wages in industrial sectors 
and thus foster investment and structural 
transformation. 
  In an open economy, sectoral linkages 
are influenced by foreign trade. The magni-
tude of the linkage effects depends on the 
existence of nontradable sectors and on im-
perfect substitutability between domestic and 
foreign goods. For example, Fei and Ranis’s 
(1961) assertion that agricultural growth is a 
prerequisite for urban growth may be less 
binding if it is possible to substitute imports 
for domestic agriculture. Nonetheless, even 
under open economy conditions, agricultural 
growth typically has stronger links to the rest 
of the economy than nonagricultural growth 
(especially in industry) because (1) agri-
cultural output is sold predominantly in do-
mestic markets; (2) intermediate inputs used 
in agricultural production are less import 
intensive than in industrial production; and 
(3) rural demand is usually met by domesti-
cally produced goods. Conversely, urban 
consumption patterns tend to favor im-
ported goods that not only weaken indus-
trial backward linkages but also lead to 
foreign exchange constraints that hamper 
capital-intensive industrialization. Export-
oriented agriculture can also undermine for-
ward linkages and agricultural production 
can be constrained by the lack of growth 
in nonagricultural incomes in both urban 
and rural areas. Therefore, foreign trade does 
dampen the linkage effects of agriculture, 
especially in smaller and more open econo-
mies, but the effect is invariably smaller for 
agriculture than for industry. 
  The role of agriculture in rural, as op-
posed to national, development was the focus 
for many agricultural economists during the 
1980s and 1990s (Hazell and Roell 1983; 
Hazell and Haggblade 1991; Haggblade, Ham-
mer, and Hazell 1991). This shift in em-
phasis was motivated by (1) imperfect or 
missing commodity and factor markets; 
(2) rigidities in rural–urban factor mobility; 
(3) high transport costs; (4) the existence 
of rural nontradable sectors; and (5) rural 
unemployment and underemployment. It 
was suggested that agricultural productivity 
growth stimulates rural economies through 
Box 2.3  Agricultural Linkages Change with Different Stages of Development
Using social accounting matrixes for 27 countries, Vogel (1994) examined the strength 
of the linkages between agriculture and the rest of the economy at different development 
stages. He found that the backward linkages are typically strong at early stages, while the 
forward linkages are much weaker. Demand created by rising rural incomes represented 
almost 70 percent of the backward linkages. Forward linkages strengthen at later stages 
of development owing to a greater and more complex integration of agricultural produc-
tion with other sectors.AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: CONVENTIONAL WIDSOM AND CURRENT DEBATE      7
production and consumption linkages at the 
regional level. Labor demand between agri-
culture and rural nonfarm activities can 
create further rural linkage effects, and re-
ciprocal reverse flows from rural nonfarm 
activities can help finance the purchase of 
agricultural inputs, which further improves 
productivity (Reardon et al. 1994; Barrett 
et al. 2003). Virtually all these studies em-
phasized the importance of infrastructure 
in improving the responsiveness of the non-
farm economy to increases in demand from 
agriculture (Barnes and Binswanger 1986; 
Ahmed 1987; Evans 1990; Hazell and Hagg-
blade 1991; Ahmed and Donovan 1992; Fan 
and Hazell 1998). Finally, some regional 
studies also considered the formation of so-
cial capital, suggesting that increased inter-
actions between farmers, input suppliers, 
processors, and banks might help generate 
the confidence and trust needed to initiate 
nonagricultural business and commercial ag-
riculture (Irz et al. 2001).
  The linkage effects emanating from ag-
ricultural growth have often been analyzed 
in countries where small farms dominate 
agriculture and the rural economy, as is the 
case in most Asian and African countries. 
Numerous empirical studies have examined 
the contribution of smallholder farming to 
agricultural growth and demonstrated that 
small farms contain poverty by providing an 
affordable platform from which poor house-
holds can experiment with ways to improve 
their livelihoods and help prevent premature 
urban migration and the explosive growth of 
large cities (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 
2004; Hazell 2004). By contrast, the trickle-
down benefits from large-scale commercial 
agriculture are usually more limited (IFAD 
2001; Lipton 2004; also see Table 2.1). 
Household surveys have also shown that 
small- and medium-sized farm households 
usually have expenditure patterns that favor 
growth in the local nonfarm economy, in-
cluding rural towns. They spend higher 
shares of incremental income on rural non-
traded goods than do large-scale farmers, 
thereby generating greater demand for lo-
cally produced labor-intensive goods and 
services (Mellor 1976; Hazell and Roell 
1983). Crucially, small farms also contrib-
ute to food security in rural areas where 
high transport and marketing costs can drive 
up food prices, and at the national level, the 
higher land productivity of small farms en-
ables poor countries to attain self-sufficiency 
in staples, such as in cereals, roots and tu-
bers, and livestock.
  The strong linkage effects of agriculture 
suggested to some theorists that agricultural 
growth could lead broader economic growth 
during the early stages of industrialization, 
even in more open countries. Singer (1979) 
Table 2.1  Comparison between family farms and commercial agriculture
Characteristics  Family farms  Commercial agriculture
Role of household labor  Major  Little or none
Community linkages    Strong—based on solidarity and mutual   Weak—often based on social 
    help between household and broader     connection between entrepreneur and 
group   local  community
Priority objectives  Consume  Sell
 Stock  Buy
 Sell  Consume
Diversification  High, to reduce exposure to risk    Low, specialization in very few crops 
 and  activities
Flexibility High  Low
Size of holding  Small, average 5–10 ha  Large, may exceed 100 ha
Links to market  Weak but becoming stronger  Strong
Land access  Inheritance and social arrangements  Purchase
Source: Toulmin and Gueye (2005).8   CHAPTER  2
described a “balanced-growth” strategy as 
one that emphasizes the “national develop-
ment of agriculture as the primary sector 
and developing industries with strong em-
phasis on agriculture–industry linkages and 
interactions” (Singer 1979). The balanced-
growth strategy was later relabeled by Adel-
man (1984) as an “agricultural-demand-
led-industrialization” (ADLI) strategy. This 
strategy stresses that increasing agricultural 
productivity expands internal demand for 
intermediate and consumer goods produced 
by domestic industries and, in turn, helps 
support the drive toward industrialization. 
Such agricultural growth generates incomes 
for the poorest members of society by in-
creasing the supply of wage goods. By con-
trast, urban-biased industrialization is seen 
as characterized by highly dualistic devel-
opment patterns, deteriorating distributions 
of income, and slowing growth in both agri-
cultural production and the national econ-
omy (Adelman 1984: 938). Adelman also 
emphasized the distributional impact of ag-
ricultural growth. A critical determinant for 
broad-based participation in the growth pro-
cess is an equitable ownership of productive 
assets, especially land, during the earliest 
stages of development. Thus, the emphasis 
in agricultural policies should shift “from 
surplus extraction to surplus creation and to 
the generation of demand linkages with the 
rest of economy” (Adelman 1984: 939). 
  The relationship between agriculture and 
broader economic growth has recently been 
examined using dynamic general equilib-
rium approaches. Theorists from this school 
develop theoretically consistent general equi-
librium models in which individual sectors, 
including agriculture, interact during the 
development process. Yang and Zhu (2004) 
use a two-sector intertemporal model to 
demonstrate that, without raising agricul-
tural productivity, a traditional economy 
cannot overcome the fixed supply of natural 
resources and therefore cannot sustain the 
growth process. Irrespective of the pace of 
nonagricultural growth, stagnant agricultural 
production during the early stages of devel-
opment prevents structural transformation 
from a traditional to a modern economy. Irz 
and Roe (2000) also found that a minimum 
rate of agricultural productivity growth is 
necessary to counter population growth and 
avoid the Malthusian trap. More importantly, 
the authors found that the demographic and 
technological characteristics of several Sub-
Saharan African countries are consistent 
with such a poverty trap. 
  Although the potential for agriculture to 
serve as an important engine in overall eco-
nomic growth appears compelling to some 
theorists, several arguments in the literature 
suggest that the causality may run in the op-
posite direction, that is, from nonagricultural 
to agricultural growth. The main thesis re-
lates to the work initiated by Gardner and 
Mundlak, who emphasized adjustments in 
the labor market as the engine of growth 
in agricultural value added per worker and 
agricultural incomes. Using data for 1960–
2001 from 85 countries, Gardner (2005) 
found that agricultural growth is surpris-
ingly independent of the per capita income 
growth for workers in the agricultural sec-
tor. Neither is necessary or sufficient for 
the other. Gardner (2000) also found that, at 
least for the United States, there is no iden-
tifiable connection between any specifically 
agricultural variable and the growth of U.S. 
farm-household incomes. Rather, the growth 
of income in a low-income farm household 
group appeared to be almost entirely attrib-
utable to increased nonfarm earnings as 
labor markets adjusted to the pre-1960 dis-
equilibrium. The dominant role of labor 
markets and growth of labor demand in the 
nonfarm economy in explaining growth in 
agricultural wages rates was also corrobo-
rated by Estudillo and Otsuka (1999), who 
examined wage rates of agricultural workers 
in the Philippines. Together these findings 
support the contemporary skepticism about 
the role of agriculture in Africa discussed 
later in this report. However, Tiffin and Irz 
(2006) used a range of time-series econo-AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: CONVENTIONAL WIDSOM AND CURRENT DEBATE      9
metric methods and concluded that in most 
cases causality runs from agricultural value 
added per worker to gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, which supports the argu-
ment that agriculture acted as the engine of 
growth.
  Theory has also moved beyond the direct 
production linkages described in the pre-
ceding text. Four of these additional roles 
are attributed to agriculture during the de-
velopment process. First, studies have shown 
a positive link between nutrition and eco-
nomic growth. Inadequate and irregular ac-
cess to food increases malnutrition, reduces 
labor productivity, and is equivalent to a 
disinvestment in human capital (Bliss and 
Stern 1978; Strauss 1986; Williamson 1993; 
Fogel 1994; Wichman 1995). Using an ex-
tended Solow growth model, Nadav (1996) 
examined the importance of nutritional cap-
ital. Drawing on a sample of 97 countries, 
the author found that nutritional levels have 
a large and significant impact on economic 
growth (see Box 2.4). This result is consis-
tent with Fogel (1991), who found that in-
creased caloric intake reduced mortality and 
raised productivity among the working poor 
during the early stages of Western Europe’s 
development. The author concluded that 
“bringing the ultra-poor into the labor force 
and raising the energy available for work by 
those in the labor force explains about 30 
percent of the British growth in per capita 
incomes over the past two centuries” (Fogel 
1991: 63).
  Second, agriculture affects economic 
growth through its potential to stabilize 
domestic food production and enhance food 
security. Periodic food crises undermine both 
political and economic stability, thereby re-
ducing the level and efficiency of investment 
(Timmer 1989, 1996; Alesina and Perotti 
1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Dawe 
1996). Although food imports may alleviate 
such crises temporarily, they are not a viable 
solution for ensuring long-term food security, 
especially given the possibility of encounter-
ing foreign exchange constraints. 
  Third, urban bias in public policies has 
distorted investment incentives and creates 
strikingly different marginal productivities 
of capital in urban and rural areas (Fan, 
Zhang, and Rao 2004). Timmer (2005) sug-
gested that correcting such distortions would 
shift the overall rate of return to capital and 
improve the efficiency of resource alloca-
tion, thereby increasing factor productivity. 
Consequently, altering investment toward 
stimulating agricultural growth also con-
tributes to the generation of broader eco-
nomic growth.
  Finally, the unique decisionmaking pro-
cesses associated with agriculture, espe-
cially smallholder agriculture, can stimulate 
broader growth by fostering the processes 
of learning and innovation (Timmer 1988). 
Box 2.4  Nutrition Is a Key Determinant of Growth
Arcand (2000) shows that the link between nutrition and economic growth is robust to 
the use of different data sets and different econometric techniques, ranging from OLS 
to GMM. Using three different cross-country data sets, he found that nutrition affects 
growth directly, through labor productivity, and indirectly, through improvements in life 
expectancy. Increasing per capita consumption of dietary energy supply to 2,770 calories 
per day in countries that are below this would directly increase growth by 0.53 percent-
age points and indirectly by 0.70 percentage points. Depending on the method and data 
used, the study found that inadequate nutrition reduces the growth rate of GDP per capita 
by about 0.20 to 4.7 percentage points. For Sub-Saharan Africa, it accounts for between 
0.16 and 4.0 percentage points. 10   CHAPTER  2
Specifically, achieving high yields depends 
on both hard work and management skills, 
especially the ability to adopt new tech-
nologies. Abramovitz (1986) attributed the 
ability to adopt productive technologies and 
operate markets to “social capability” and 
found that the initial level of social capabil-
ity explained intercountry differences in the 
trajectories pursued by different industrializ-
ing European countries.5 Likewise, Temple 
and Johnson (1996) used the Adelman-
Morris index of socioeconomic development 
as a proxy for social capability. By control-
ling for income per capita, the authors 
showed that countries with higher average 
economic growth rates during 1960–85 had 
higher levels of social capability in 1960. 
This area of the literature suggests that to 
mobilize a country’s social capability during 
the early stages of development, it is neces-
sary to harness farmers’ entrepreneurial po-
tential and accordingly develop technologies 
that improve their management capabilities. 
These rural entrepreneurs can in turn help 
drive nonagricultural growth in both rural 
and urban areas. 
Agricultural Growth and 
Poverty Reduction 
Given the size of the agricultural sector in 
most developing countries, its growth has 
implications not only for growth in other 
sectors but also for poverty and inequality. 
However, as Atkinson (1997) noted, there is 
no unified theory of income distribution. 
Rather the empirical debate has revolved 
around the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, which 
predicts that income inequality rises first 
and then falls with economic development. 
Kuznets based his speculation on longitu-
dinal data on the industrial countries’ devel-
opment histories. Subsequent cross-country 
estimations have tended to support this hy-
pothesis. However, recent and more sophis-
ticated country-level analyses find little evi-
dence of a systematic link between inequality 
an d  th e  ra te  o f  ec o n o mi c  gr o wth  (M e ll o r 
1999; Kanbur and Squire 2001). For ex-
ample, Lopez (2004) accounted for coun-
tries’ initial conditions in a cross-country 
estimation and found that growth is more 
important for poverty reduction during the 
earliest stages of development (that is, at 
low income levels). However, the analysis 
also suggests that inequality increasingly 
becomes a constraint to poverty reduction 
during later stages of development.
  Most studies show that growth has a 
significant impact on poverty reduction, but 
there is substantial variation in the literature 
about the extent to which poverty declines 
(Dollar and Kraay 2002). This variation 
highlights the importance of understanding 
the structure of growth and its relationship 
with poverty. Accordingly, linking sectoral 
growth and poverty reduction has become 
a focus in the literature (Mellor 1999). A 
growing econometric literature uses cross-
country or time-series data to estimate sec-
toral and subsectoral growth–poverty elastici-
ti es ( f or e xamp l e, T immer 1 997 ; Ra v alli on 
and Datt 1999; see also Box 2.5 for more 
examples). Agricultural growth, as opposed 
to growth in general, is typically found to be 
the primary source of poverty reduction. 
Nonagricultural growth is found to have a 
greater impact on overall growth, because in 
many Asian and Latin American countries 
these sectors have tended to grow faster than 
agriculture.6 However, in the early stages 
of development these high nonagricultural 
growth rates have typically been achieved 
only when agriculture is also growing rap-
idly. The reason is that the resources used 
for agricultural growth are only marginally 
5A similar strand of research concerns “tacit knowledge,” or learning-by-doing, and its importance for innova-
tion and development (Howells 2002). 
6The growth decompositions in the appendix show that industrial growth in SSA was in fact below agricultural 
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competitive with those of other sectors, and 
thus fast agricultural growth tends to be ad-
ditive to growth in other sectors and is a 
stimulant of growth in the labor-intensive 
nontradable sectors (Mellor 1966, 1976). 
Therefore, not only does agricultural growth 
favor the poor, but it also does not under-
mine the poverty-reducing effects of other 
sectors (see Box 2.5).
  The strong poverty-reducing effect of ag-
ricultural growth is due in part to its genera-
tion of both agricultural and nonagricultural 
employment. As mentioned earlier, agricul-
ture is the largest employer in developing 
countries, either directly or indirectly engag-
ing more than half of the labor force. This 
dominance is particularly true in labor-
abundant economies where small farm house-
holds often account for large shares of the 
rural and poor populations. A key rela-
tionship between growth in agriculture and 
poverty is that agricultural growth directly 
generates demand for rural labor. Increasing 
agricultural productivity, especially in coun-
tries facing land constraints, requires the 
intensification of farming systems through 
yield-enhancing technologies. Although such 
technologies raise labor productivity, they 
also require additional labor as well as mod-
ern intermediate inputs. Hayami and Ruttan 
(1985) reviewed the literature on the effect 
of modern varieties of rice and wheat in Asia 
Box 2.5  Growth in Agriculture Benefits the Poor in Both Rural and Urban Areas
Using panel data from India for 1951 to 1990, Ravallion and Datt (1996) found strong 
evidence that the urban–rural composition of growth matters to poverty reduction. While 
urban growth reduced urban poverty, its effect was not significantly different from zero 
in explaining the rate of poverty reduction nationally. On the other hand, rural growth 
reduced poverty in rural and urban areas and hence had a significant, positive effect on 
national poverty reduction.
  By disaggregating different types of households in a 1980 Social Accounting Matrix 
for Indonesia, Thorbecke and Jung (1996) were able to decompose growth linkages into 
distributional and interdependency effects. The distributional effects are in turn further 
broken down into intersectional, direct-distributional, and inter-household transfer link-
ages. They found that the agricultural sector contributes the most to overall poverty 
alleviation, followed by the services and informal sectors. The manufacturing sector as 
a whole contributes the least to poverty alleviation, although the food processing and 
textile subsectors within manufacturing made relatively large contributions to poverty 
alleviation by employing unskilled workers.
  Using data for 1985 to 1996 for China, Fan, Chan-King, and Mukherjee (2005) 
estimated an econometric model to measure and compare the relative contributions of 
rural and urban growth to poverty reduction. The authors found that correcting for urban 
bias leads to higher growth in agriculture, which reduces both rural and urban poverty, 
though the pro-poor effect is largest for rural areas. On the other hand, urban growth 
contributes only to urban poverty reduction and its effect on the rural poor is neither 
positive nor statistically significant. 
  Based on data from a broad sample of developing countries in the early 1970s and 
mid-1980s, Bourguignon and Morrison (1998) found that variables that measure agri-
cultural productivity are important in explaining income inequality. Using cross-country 
regressions for each time period separately and then for the pooled data, the authors found 
that increasing agricultural productivity is the most efficient path for many countries to 
reduce poverty and inequality. 12   CHAPTER  2
and concluded that their introduction typi-
cally resulted in an increase in labor re-
quirements per unit of land for each crop, as 
well as an increase in the number of crops 
grown (cropping intensity) per year. 
  Lipton and Longhurst (1989) suggested 
that, in its initial stages, the green revolution 
raised the labor intensity of agricultural pro-
duction, although this higher labor demand 
was slowly eroded by subsequent adoptions 
of labor-displacing inputs. Similarly, Bins-
wanger and Quizon (1986) found a low but 
positive output elasticity of agriculture with 
respect to labor. Growth in agriculture also 
results from a shift from low-value to high-
value crop or livestock production. Most 
high-value production, such as in horticul-
ture and intensified livestock production, are 
highly labor intensive. Moreover, unlike the 
more capital-intensive industrial sectors, 
agriculture has demonstrated its ability to 
generate employment opportunities for the 
poorest populations.7 A large body of em-
pirical studies of the green revolution in 
Asia demonstrates how agricultural growth 
reached many small farms and raised large 
numbers of people out of poverty (see Rose-
grant and Hazell 2000).
  Most of the world’s poor are rural and 
will remain so until 2035 (IFAD 2001). Al-
though agricultural growth is necessary to 
reduce poverty gaps between urban and rural 
areas, nonfarm activities are also an impor-
tant source of cash income for rural house-
holds (Ashley and Maxwell 2001). However, 
the contribution of nonfarm activities to 
household income is often related to agri-
culture during the early stages of develop-
ment. Furthermore, apart from the land  less 
rural population, most rural farm households 
manage risk by diversifying their incomes 
through off-farm activities. Agricultural 
growth reduces poverty by providing a mar-
ket for nonfarm products, especially given 
the high labor intensity of nonfarm produc-
tion. Although the early stages of techno-
logical change often directly benefit richer 
farmers who can more easily adopt the new 
technology, the consumption linkages gen-
erated by rising farm incomes can stimulate 
g r o w t h  i n  l o c a l  m a r k e t s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  e v e n  
households that do not benefit directly from 
improved technology will benefit indirectly 
through improved employment opportunities.
  Agricultural growth also benefits rural 
and urban consumers alike by driving down 
food prices. The poor typically spend a high 
share of their income on food and there-
fore benefit from increases in food produc-
tion that reduce prices. The strength of this 
effect depends, ho wev er , on the degree to 
which farm production is tradable and the 
associated price elasticity of demand. For 
example, Alston et al. (1998a) showed that, 
following an increase in supply, the price 
decrease determining the distribution of 
benefits between producers and consumers 
depends on the elasticity of demand, which 
in turn depends primarily on the size of the 
market supplied (that is, tradability).8 The 
i m p o rt a n c e  o f  f o o d  s u p p l y  i n  t h e  g r o w t h  
process has already been discussed earlier; 
its link to poverty reduction should be under-
stood within the broader context of develop-
ment. By benefiting the poor, agricultural 
growth facilitates development by smooth-
ing structural transformation and reducing 
potentially painful adjustment costs as in-
7For land-abundant countries, expansion in cultivated area is often associated with increased labor usage, which 
provides employment opportunities for the poor even though land productivity may not increase. Chapter 3 
examines sectoral variations within agriculture in more detail. 
8When markets are poorly integrated and infrastructure is underdeveloped, increased output is likely to cause 
substantial falls in output prices, which consequently reduces the benefits to producers, even though gains to 
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equality becomes more binding on growth 
later in the development process.
Contemporary Skepticism 
about the Role of 
Agriculture in Africa
Despite the theories described in the pre-
ceding text and the numerous Asian case 
studies that support them, there is doubt 
about whether agriculture can successfully 
g e n e r a t e  e n o u g h  g r o w t h  i n  A f r i c a  t o d a y  
(see, for example, Collier 2002; Maxwell and 
Slater 2003; Ellis 2005). In many respects, 
this doubt harks back to the immediate post-
independence industrialization policies of 
many low-income countries, including coun-
tries in Africa. At that time, priority was 
given to heavily subsidized and protected 
industries, while agriculture was penalized 
and plundered through unfavorable macro-
economic, trade, tax, and pricing policies. 
More recent skepticism among development 
scholars about the relevance of agriculture 
to growth is based mainly on the recogni-
tion of changed local and global conditions 
for Africa as a result of globalization. Some 
of the key positions promoted by this new 
breed of agricultural skeptics are elaborated 
below. 
Bypassing Agricultural 
Development via Cheap 
Food Imports 
The trade perspective that dominated much 
development thinking in the 1970s and 1980s 
has returned today with a new emphasis on 
the benefits of globalization. Early develop-
ment economists acknowledged that trade 
could expand sufficiently to provide a nec-
essary growth stimulus, but argued that trade 
alone is insufficient to promote development 
(Adelman 2001). For example, based on 
neoclassical trade theory, it is plausible for 
resource-rich countries in Africa to export 
abundant nonagricultural natural resources, 
such as oil and minerals, and import agri-
cultural goods to meet their domestic de-
mand. This strategy might appear to elimi-
nate the need to modernize agricultural 
sectors. However, although the static effi-
ciency gains in resource allocation explained 
by trade theory are an important condition 
for growth and development, improvements 
in resource allocation by themselves do not 
generate sustained growth or broader devel-
opment. Exports of natural resources can be-
come an engine of growth only if the income 
generated from exports is channeled into pro-
ductivity growth in non–natural- resource sec-
tors and helps develop the broader economy. 
  In practice, it is almost impossible for any 
country to achieve sustainable growth by 
following trade theory and fully specializing 
in the exports of natural resource products. 
The existence of nontradable sectors such as 
services and other manufacturing sectors 
that are not inputs into oil and mineral pro-
duction implies a much more complicated 
general equilibrium outcome that takes full 
account of the interlinkages between trad-
ables and nontradables, and exportables and 
importables. Economic theory predicts a 
possible “Dutch Disease” outcome in which 
growth in the oil and mineral export sector 
leads to an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate that penalizes other traded goods sec-
tors, including agriculture. Income distribu-
tion is often another serious problem in such 
an economy, because rents are often cap-
tured by a small group of the population in 
the country or benefit an elite interest group 
through government intervention. Typically 
labeled as “enclave economies,” these ex-
port sectors are often capital intensive with 
little demand for labor and weak links to the 
domestic economy through production and 
consumption.
  While the recent “bypass” argument is 
new in the sense that globalization and trade 
liberalization provide more export opportu-
nities and make food even cheaper on the 
international market, the difficulties created 
by earlier attempts to bypass agriculture 
remain. Collier (2005) argues that natural 
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should be the main economic priority for 
natural-resource-rich African countries 
to reach middle income status, whereas for 
the resource-scarce and coastal countries, the 
success of economic growth lies in their 
breaking into global markets for labor-
intensive manufacturing exports. Unfortu-
nately, however, most African countries 
possess a small and inefficient industrial 
base with an unimpressiv e gro wth perfor -
mance. Turning this performance around 
in an open trade environment is a daunting 
task. Not only are fledgling industries ex-
pected to compete with the world’s best in 
export markets, but in addition trade liberal-
ization is a two-edged sword that also opens 
domestic markets to imports that can deci-
mate whole swaths of industry before they 
have a chance to adjust and compete. The 
approach contrasts sharply with the proven 
and successful approach of many Asian 
countries that first nurtured their industries 
through growth in protected domestic mar-
kets and subsidized exports before requiring 
them to face the full force of international 
competition.
  Second, there is a scaling-up problem. 
Industry currently employs about 10 to 15 
percent of the labor force in Africa, and its 
employment elasticity remains low com-
pared to that of agriculture. Even if the per-
f o rm an c e  o f  th e  i n d u s tri al  s e c t o r  w e r e  t o  
improve dramatically and grew at the rates 
observed in many of Asia’ s “tiger” econo-
mies during their golden years, it would still 
take decades before a large enough share 
of the labor force could be pulled out of 
agriculture to lead to a serious reduction in 
poverty. 
  Third, despite low world food prices, 
food costs remain high for many Africans 
because of high transport costs within the 
continent. Growing food where it is needed 
is still the least expensive option for many 
Africans. Moreover, although fixed exchange 
rates are largely a thing of the past, increas-
ing food imports still places pressure on 
foreign exchange markets, leading to cur-
rency depreciation and higher food costs in 
local currencies. This in turn raises real 
wages and dampens industrialization.
  It also needs to be reiterated that, as 
mentioned earlier, the early industrialization 
policies adopted by most African countries 
have resulted in serious urban bias in both 
public and private investments as well as 
in governments’ macroeconomic and trade 
policies. Many of these policies have been 
abandoned, but an urban bias still influences 
public investment and policy priorities in 
many countries today. If the new bypass 
argument further influences the investment 
policies of African governments and inter-
national donors, it would create huge chal-
lenges for generating agricultural-led growth 
in Africa.
The “Rethinking Rural 
Development” School
More recently, Ashley and Maxwell (2001), 
Ellis and Harris (2004), and others have 
advocated “rethinking rural development.” 
They argued that rural areas are highly 
heterogeneous in size, structure, capability 
of their populations, patterns of economic 
activity, and degree of integration with na-
tional and international economies. In most 
areas, agriculture is a relatively small pro-
ductive sector, which will be commercially 
incorporated into national and international 
commodity chains. Most rural households 
already have diverse and geographically 
dispersed portfolios of income sources. 
Considering these changes, those who sub-
scribe to the “rethinking rural development” 
school question whether agriculture can be 
the engine of rural growth and suggest in-
stead promoting poverty reduction through 
a rural livelihoods framework. Ellis and 
Harris (2004) go further to suggest that 
public investment should be geared toward 
improving the ease with which migrants 
can access major cities, where growth is as-
sumed to be taking place. Migration there-
fore provides an opportunity for the benefits 
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holds, where agriculture-based incomes re-
main stagnant.
  Several arguments are also used to ques-
tion the role of agriculture given the chang-
ing global environment. First, long-term 
global declines in agricultural commodity 
prices have undermined the profitability of 
agriculture as a business. Second, the policy 
instruments that supported the green rev-
olution in Asian countries, such as price 
supports, fertilizer and credit subsidies, and 
irrigation schemes, are less acceptable mod-
els of public sector intervention today. Fi-
nally, the pressure on the natural resource 
base for agriculture is leading to worsening 
degradation and even declining productiv-
ity. In addition, Ashley and Maxwell (2001) 
noted that the expectation of equitable growth 
through agriculture depends on the success 
of small farms. Yet, the rise in supermarkets, 
the growing importance of quality standards, 
and poor access to markets increasingly 
threaten the ability of smallholder farmers 
to compete with large-scale, commercial 
farmers. 
  Although this school is pessimistic about 
the potential of agriculture, it provides few 
viable alternatives to the primary growth 
role of agriculture in the early stages of de-
velopment or explains how growth will occur 
in Africa’s urban areas, where high unem-
ployment and informal economies often 
dominate. Instead, it emphasizes migration 
and rural nonfarm activities and believes 
diversification options for multi-occupation 
and multi-location households can become 
the relevant engine of growth for rural areas 
in Africa. Indeed, rural income diversifica-
tion has been a reality in developing coun-
tries for decades. In fact, the first large-scale 
rural household survey in Africa conducted 
in 1974–75 in Kenya found that smallholders 
derived at least half of their incomes from 
sources other than the farming of their own 
lands (Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics 
1977). Reardon et al. (1994) also reported a 
similar situation from a series of studies in 
eight West African countries, and a review 
of 35 African case studies by Barrett and 
Reardon (2000) revealed that rural house-
holds derived a median of 43 percent of 
their incomes from the nonfarm economy.
  Nevertheless, diversification into non-
farm activities is not an unequivocally posi-
tive phenomenon. On the one hand, diversi-
fication may reflect a successful structural 
transformation in which rural workers are 
gradually absorbed into more lucrative non-
farm jobs, such as teaching, milling, or 
welding. Entry into these formal jobs often 
requires some capital, qualifications, and/or 
possibly social contacts (Start 2001; Thirtle 
et al. 2001). In this case, widespread rural 
nonfarm growth can go hand in hand with 
broad-based agricultural growth, as occurred 
in several East Asian countries. Alternatively, 
migration to urban areas can be spurred by 
desperation rather than by rural success, as 
is the case in many African countries where 
diversification into the nonfarm economy is 
driven by growing land scarcity, declining 
wages, and poor agricultural growth (Start 
2001; Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2002). 
When used as a coping strategy, nonfarm 
jobs are frequently informal, risky, and pro-
vide low returns, especially when barriers to 
entry are low and competition for employ-
ment is high (Collier and Gunning 1999; 
Thirtle et al. 2001). The segmented nature 
of the rural nonfarm economy contributes 
to a replication of existing inequalities as 
wealthier farmers can better access those 
opportunities with the highest returns (Start 
2001). As such, agricultural production rep-
resents an important safety net for poor 
farmers by offering both food security and 
the social support of an agrarian-based com-
munity (Bryceson 2000). 
  Thus, if most African farmers have been 
unable to find pathways out of poverty de-
spite income diversification strategies over 
the past several decades, then it is unclear 
why such a strategy should work better 
today, particularly in countries where the 
nonagricultural sectors are not thriving ei-
ther. Even in many Asian countries, farmers 16   CHAPTER  2
were highly diversified before the green 
revolution (see evidence from India in Ra-
vallion and Datt 1996). As Lipton (2004) ar-
gues, “Europe in 1740–1900 and Asia since 
1 960 sho w that w hen urban industrializa-
tion offers major prospects for employment 
(and poverty reduction), it is fairly late in an 
already successful, agriculture-led devel-
opment process.” Yet, it is important to dis-
tinguish drivers from supporters of rural 
growth (Kydd 2005). Migration driven by a 
stagnant agricultural and rural environment 
or due to growth in low-productivity urban 
sector activity, such as public service em-
ployment, is often a dead end, which Lipton 
characterizes as “the migration of despair.” 
In this case, migration “depresses wage 
rates, denudes rural areas of innovators, and 
hence, while it may briefly relieve extreme 
need, seldom cuts chronic poverty” (Lipton 
2004: 7).
Lessening the Role of Small 
Farms in Future Agricultural 
Investment Strategies
Agricultural marketing chains are changing 
dramatically owing to trade liberalization 
and broader processes of globalization. The 
small farmer is increasingly being asked to 
compete in markets that are much more de-
manding in terms of quality and food safety, 
more concentrated and integrated, and much 
more open to international competition. Su-
permarkets, for example, are playing a much 
more dominant role in controlling access to 
r e tail  m ar k e t s  (R e ar d o n  e t  al .  2 00 3 ) ,  an d 
direct links to exporters are often essential 
for accessing high-value export markets. As 
small farms struggle to diversify into higher 
value products, they must increasingly meet 
the requirements of these demanding mar-
kets, both at home and overseas. Although 
these changes may offer new opportunities to 
small farmers who can successfully access 
and compete in these transformed markets, 
they are mainly seen as a serious threat to 
smallholders (Maxwell 2005). 
  At the same time as markets have be-
come more unforgiving, structural adjust-
ment and privatization programs have left 
many small farmers without adequate ac-
cess to key inputs and services, including 
farm credit. State agencies no longer pro-
vide many direct marketing and service 
functions to small farms, leaving a vacuum 
that the private sector has yet to fill in many 
countries (Kherallah et al. 2002). The re-
moval of subsidies has also made some key 
inputs, such as fertilizer, prohibitively ex-
pensive for many small farmers, and the 
removal of price stabilization programs has 
exposed farmers to greater price volatility. 
These problems are especially difficult for 
small farmers living in more remote regions 
with poor infrastructure and market access. 
Within this context, there is a growing view 
that most smallholders do not have a viable 
future in farming, and that agricultural de-
velopment should now focus on larger and 
commercially oriented farms that can suc-
cessfully link to the new types of market 
chains. 
  Admittedly, many of the economic and 
social advantages offered by small farms (as 
discussed earlier) slowly disappear as coun-
tries develop and labor becomes scarcer rel-
ative to land and capital, leading to a natural 
transition toward larger farms and an exodus 
of small farm workers to towns and non-
farm jobs. Yet, this transition does not nor-
mally begin until countries have grown out 
of low-income status, and it typically takes 
several generations to unfold. A common 
misdiagnosis stems from overlooking this 
broader economic context for determining 
the economics of farm size.
  For most low-income countries, the prob-
lem is not that small farms are inherently 
unviable in today’s marketplace, but that they 
face an increasingly tilted playing field that, 
if left unchecked, could lead to their prema-
ture demise. Key requirements for ensuring 
their survival will be improving infrastruc-
ture and education, ensuring that small farms 
get the technologies and key inputs that they 
need, and promoting producer marketing 
organizations that can link small farmers to 
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not do all these things on their own, and the 
public, private, and nongovernmental orga-
nization (NGO) sectors all have important 
roles to play. The social and economic ben-
efits from these kinds of interventions have 
the potential to be enormous. 
Focusing Agricultural Development 
on High-Value Commodities and 
Value-Added Processing
With chronic global surpluses of major food 
staples and rapid expansion in international 
agricultural trade, many see high-value com-
modities such as fruits, flowers and vege-
tables as the best opportunities for develop-
ing country farmers. In many successfully 
transformed countries, domestic demand for 
these products is growing rapidly and provid-
ing ready market outlets for increased do-
mestic production. Yet, in many low-income 
countries, domestic demand is much weaker, 
and the best opportunities are seen in export 
markets. Many African countries, for ex-
ample, are being encouraged to expand into 
high-value, nontraditional exports, as well 
as to improve the quality of their traditional 
tree crop exports. 
  In reality, the market opportunities for 
African agriculture are more nuanced (Diao 
and Hazell 2004). There are opportunities 
for improving traditional exports through 
better quality and niche markets, and non-
traditional exports are growing quite fast, 
albeit from a small base, but the greatest 
market potential for most African farmers 
still lies in domestic and regional markets for 
food staples (cereals, roots and tubers, pulses, 
oil crops, and livestock products). For Africa 
as a whole, the consumption of these com-
modities accounts for more than 70 percent 
of agricultural output and is projected to 
double by 2015. This growth will add about 
US$50 billion per year to demand in 1996–
2000 prices (see Table 2.2). Moreover, with 
increasing commercialization and urban-
ization, much of this additional demand will 
translate into market transactions and not just 
additional on-farm consumption. No other 
agricultural markets could offer such growth 
potential and benefit to Africa’s small farmers 
at such huge scales. Many small farms could 
significantly increase their incomes if they 
could capture a large share of this market 
growth. 
Roles of the Public and 
Private Sectors in Africa’s 
Agricultural Development
As agricultural markets become more glo-
balized and consumer driven, it is now fash-
ionable to think that the private sector and 
producer organizations can perform most 
market chain functions. In this new para-
digm, the government’s role should be lim-
ited to creating an enabling environment, 
such as setting and regulating grades and 
standards, ensuring food safety, and register-
ing and enforcing contracts. This contrasts 
Table 2.2  The size of Sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural markets
  Market value (US$ billion)
 Eastern  Southern  Western  Total
 Africa  Africa  Africa  Africa
Traditional exports to non-African countries  2.2  2.4  4.0  8.6
Nontraditional exports to non-African countries  1.3  2.8  2.0  6.1
Other exports to non-African countries  0.5  0.7  0.7  1.9
Intra-African trade  0.4  1.1  0.4  1.9
Domestic markets for food staples  17.6  12.1  20.1  49.7
Sources:      Trade figures are from UN COMTRADE (United Nations 2005) and are 1996–2000 averages; 
domestic-market figures are for 2000 from FAO (2003). 
Note:    Domestic market demand includes the value of own consumption.18   CHAPTER  2
sharply with the key role that the public sec-
tor played in food staple market chains dur-
ing the early years of the green revolution 
in Asia, which is characterized as a state-
driven, market-mediated, and small-farmer 
based strategy to increase national self-
sufficiency in food grains (Sida 2006). 
  At that time, Asian governments set out 
to stimulate food production by providing 
most key services themselves, including in-
vestments in irrigation and transport infra-
structure, research and extension services, 
marketing chains for the supply of improved 
seeds and fertilizer, and credit provision. The 
governments often intervened to stabilize 
prices for producers and consumers alike, 
and provided subsidies for many key inputs 
to encourage their uptake. These govern-
ments assumed a leading role in agricultural 
development and went far beyond a facilitat-
ing role. Work at IFPRI on India shows the 
government interventions played a key role 
in launching the green revolution (Dorward 
et al. 2004a, Chapter 3). They also helped 
ensure that small farmers were able to par-
ticipate, which contributed greatly to the 
levels of poverty reduction achieved. The 
authors’ calculations show that most of these 
policies and interventions had favorable 
benefit/cost ratios in the early years, but 
the ratios worsened over time once the inter-
ventions had served their primary purposes. 
Unfortunately, once these interventions are 
institutionalized, they are very difficult to 
remove, and as input use increased, the costs 
to the governments soared. Today, for ex-
ample, India spends about $10 billion per 
year on unproductive subsidies. 
  The international development commu-
nity is concerned about the high costs and 
inefficiencies of public interventions in Asia. 
Accordingly, it generally recommends that 
Africa launch an agricultural revolution re-
lying almost exclusively on the private sec-
tor and producer organizations. However, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the pri-
vate sector can take the lead in market chains 
for staple foods during the early stages of ag-
ricultural development. As farmers struggle 
with low productivity and high subsistence 
needs, low input use, low incomes, poor 
infrastructure, high risks, and the like, the 
a m o u n t  o f  p r o f i t  t o  b e  m a d e  i n  m a r k e t  
chains for food staples remains low and 
unattractive for much private investment. A 
growing body of studies also shows that 
important institutional and market failures 
are to be expected early in the development 
process (Dorward, Kydd, and Poulton 1998). 
For example, no Asian country developed 
its food staple agriculture from a subsis-
tence to market orientation without public 
intervention in the market chains.
  Current skepticism about African agri-
culture is thus borne out of the new chal-
lenges facing Africa and the world today. 
However, the theoretical and empirical evi-
dence still suggests an important role for 
agriculture in Africa’s development as well 
as an active role for the public sector. This 
is not a recommendation to return to costly 
and inefficient parastatals or hefty and poorly 
t a r g e t e d  s u b s i d i e s .  N o r  i s  i t  a n  a r g u m e n t  
against a strong role for the private sector, 
especially in areas where it does work, such 
as in many high-value market chains. What 
is needed is a better understanding of the 
aspects of public intervention that worked 
in Asia (for example, Dorward, Kydd, and 
Poulton 1998). Then, important lessons can 
be drawn about the institutional innovations 
needed to bring those essential ingredients to 
Africa, such as through innovative public–
private partnerships. Even most Asian coun-
tries still remain cautious about moving too 
rapidly toward fully privatized markets for 
food staples.19
CHAPTER 3
The Role of Agriculture in Africa:
Selected Country Case Studies
T
he debate summarized in earlier chapters is far from resolved, but greater resolution is 
possible if it is recognized that country context matters and agriculture has different 
roles to play in different circumstances. For example, the agricultural sector as a whole, 
and food staples in particular, would seem to be more important in the early stages of eco-
nomic development when they dominate a country’s national income and employment, but 
these roles diminish as a country develops and agriculture becomes a relatively small sector. 
Agriculture also has a bigger role in countries with good agricultural potential and limited 
prospects for export earnings from minerals or manufacturing. Agriculture is often found to 
be more important in developing countries dominated by small family farms, while countries 
with dynamic and growing national economies and rising per capita incomes offer farmers 
more opportunities to diversify into higher value products and nonfarm sources of income. 
Conversely, in poorer and slower growing economies, opportunities for income diversification 
and exit strategies are much more limited. To bring greater contextual specificity to the debate 
requires construction of a country typology.
A Typology of African Countries
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the role of agriculture is closely related 
to a country’s stage of development. Accordingly, per capita income is used in the typology as 
a proxy for development to classify African countries into low- and middle-income groups 
(see Table 3.1). Only 8 percent of Africa’s population lives in middle-income countries, where 
average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is almost ten times higher than the average for 
low-income Africa (see Table A1 in the appendix).9 Agriculture is less important in   middle-
income countries and on average generates less than 10 percent of GDP. Higher average per 
capita incomes typically correspond to lower poverty rates, with middle-income countries in 
total containing less than 1 percent of Africa’s poor population. However, one-half of the pop-
ulation in middle-income countries still lives in rural areas, and in most cases the poor still 
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. For example, two-thirds of Swaziland’s population 
lives on less than a dollar a day, with a vast majority of these people living in rural areas de-
pendent on agricultural incomes. Therefore, agriculture may not be a dominant sector in most 
middle-income economies, but it is still likely to play an important role in reducing poverty. 
9These countries are shown in the far-right column of the typology and have per capita GDP above US$1,000 
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  This study focuses on low-income coun-
tries. More than 90 percent of Africa’s pop-
ulation lives in low-income countries where 
per capita incomes average 1 dollar per day. 
Agriculture accounts for around one-third of 
GDP, and two-thirds of the population live 
in rural areas. The industrial sector, includ-
ing mining, accounts for less than a quarter 
of GDP. Although services collectively com-
prise the largest sector on average, this sec-
tor consists mainly of public and nontradable 
services. For example, the government in 
most low-income African countries accounts 
for around 10 percent of GDP. Most private 
services are closely tied to agricultural and 
industrial production and are therefore un-
likely to become engines of growth during 
the early stages of development. 
  To understand better the role of agricul-
ture within the low-income group it is nec-
essary to further distinguish countries ac-
cording to a range of indicators reflecting 
agricultural potential and alternative sources 
of growth (see Table 3.1). Agricultural po-
tentials draw on a classificatory scheme 
developed by Dixon, Gulliver, and Gibbon 
(2001) and include a range of measures such 
as agroecological conditions and population 
densities.10 According to this indicator, 26 
out of the 34 low-income African countries 
have more favorable agricultural potential. 
However, even in countries with favorable 
conditions, agriculture competes with other 
sectors for limited resources. Countries with 
rich mineral and oil endowments may have 
alternative sources of growth and so are sep-
arated in the typology. Furthermore, coastal 
countries may have advantages in export-
oriented agriculture or greater opportunities 
in nonagricultural sectors. Therefore, coastal 
and landlocked countries are also separated. 
The typology therefore identifies four groups 
of low-income countries: (1) coastal; (2) land-
locked; (3) mineral-rich; and (4) less favor-
able agricultural potential. The characteris-
tics of each group are discussed in turn.
Coastal Countries without Large 
Mineral Resources
More than four-fifths of Africa’s population 
lives in one of the 26 low-income countries 
classified as having more favorable agricul-
tural conditions. Although 17 of these 26 
countries have access to the coast, many have 
significant mineral or oil resources and so 
are classified as mineral-rich in the typology. 
Therefore, although half of Africa’s popula-
tion lives in coastal countries, only one-fifth 
lives in coastal countries without large min-
eral or oil resources. These ten countries 
form the first group in the typology (first row 
in Table 3.1). These countries have more fa-
vorable agricultural conditions, fewer natu-
ral barriers to trade, and their development 
is less likely to be driven by mineral-based 
industry. 
  The first group of coastal countries lies 
mostly in West Africa, with the exception of 
Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania along 
the eastern coast. They have grown at an 
annual rate of 3.5 percent over the past 15 
years, which is higher than the average for 
low-income Africa. Agriculture accounts 
for one-third of GDP compared to one-fifth 
for industry. Thus, although the 3.5 percent 
growth rate of agriculture per year is lower 
than that of industry, the sector’s contribu-
tion to overall GDP growth is larger.
  Almost two-thirds of the population of 
these coastal countries lives in rural areas, 
where poverty is most severe. However, pov-
erty as a whole is lower in coastal countries, 
with 41 percent of the population falling 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line com-
pared to more than 56 percent for low-  income 
Africa as a whole. Furthermore, a number of 
outlier countries raise the average poverty 
rate for the coastal group, such as Guinea-
Bissau and Tanzania. The remaining coastal 
countries have substantially lower poverty 
rates, many of which fall below the aver-
age poverty rate for middle-income African 
countries. 
10See Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for more details on the data underlying the typology.22   CHAPTER  3
Landlocked Countries without 
Large Mineral Resources
One characteristic of Africa is its large 
number of landlocked countries. The 14 low-
  income African countries that do not have 
coastal access account for more than a third 
of Africa’s total population. This is substan-
tially higher than in other developing regions 
of the world. Being landlocked can present 
a significant natural barrier to trade and can 
undermine both agricultural and industrial 
export opportunities. Furthermore, many of 
Africa’s landlocked countries have particu-
larly poor agricultural conditions, especially 
those lying in the Sahel. However, the sec-
ond group of countries in the typology in-
cludes only the landlocked countries that 
have more favorable agricultural conditions 
and that do not have large mineral or oil 
resources (second row in Table 3.1). These 
six countries, which are classified as “land-
locked” in the typology, account for one-
fifth of Africa’s total population. 
  Similar to the first group of coastal 
countries, agriculture and industry account 
for one-third and one-fifth of GDP respec-
tively. Although per capita GDP is lower in 
landlocked countries than in coastal coun-
tries, the former has experienced slightly 
faster growth over the past 15 years. The 
composition of growth in landlocked and 
coastal countries is very similar, with agri-
culture growing more slowly than industry 
but contributing more to the overall GDP 
growth. Despite similar economic structures, 
the share of the population living in rural 
areas is substantially higher in landlocked 
countries at almost 80 percent. Poverty is 
also higher, with 55 percent of the popula-
tion falling below the dollar-a-day poverty 
line. Again, the average level of poverty is 
biased upward by outlier countries, in this 
case by Ethiopia’s extremely high poverty 
rate. However, after removing outliers, the 
remaining landlocked countries still tend 
to have higher poverty rates than coastal 
countries. Therefore, despite initial condi-
tions similar to those of coastal countries, 
landlocked countries tend to have lower per 
capita incomes, higher poverty , and larger 
rural populations. 
Mineral-Rich Countries
A further characteristic of Africa is its sub-
stantial mineral wealth. Two-fifths of Africa’s 
population lives in low-income countries with 
both favorable agricultural conditions and 
significant mineral and oil resources. Fur-
thermore, the countries have grown slowly 
over the past 15 years at an average GDP 
growth rate of only 1.4 percent per year. As 
expected, industry, which includes mining, 
is more important in mineral-rich countries, 
accounting for 35 percent of GDP. However, 
as with other low-income African countries, 
agriculture still generates one-third of GDP 
in mineral-rich countries. Moreover, agri-
culture has grown at 2.8 percent per year 
compared to only 1.3 percent for industry. 
Therefore, agriculture is still the primary 
source of growth in many mineral-rich coun-
tries, contributing on average twice as much 
as industry to overall GDP growth. 
  Average per capita GDP is highest for 
mineral-rich countries. However, there is 
considerable variation in this group, which 
includes countries with both the highest 
and lowest GDP per capita among all low-
income African countries. Although the 
industrial sector is larger in mineral-rich 
countries, almost 60 percent of the popula-
tion still lives in rural areas. Furthermore, 
despite higher average per capita incomes, 
poverty is substantially higher in mineral-
rich countries, with 70 percent of the popu-
lation falling below the dollar-a-day poverty 
line. Therefore, while many low-income Af-
rican countries are well endowed with min-
eral resources and therefore have alternative 
opportunities for growth outside of agricul-
ture, these natural endowments have so far 
failed to generate significant growth or pov-
erty reduction. 
Countries with Less Favorable 
Agricultural Potential 
The final group includes countries with less 
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of whether they are landlocked, coastal, or 
mineral-rich. Only 10 percent of Africa’s 
population lives in these countries. There is 
considerable diversity across countries in this 
group. Many are situated in the Sahel and 
have poor access to the coast. By contrast, 
the coastal countries in this group are island 
states, while the landlocked countries include 
mountainous Rwanda and Burundi. Despite 
poor conditions, agriculture generates almost 
40 percent of GDP, which is twice the size of 
industry. Furthermore, agriculture has grown 
substantially faster than industry over the 
past 15 years. Strong growth and a large 
share of GDP imply that agriculture has been 
the primary driver of growth in these coun-
tries, contributing almost three times more 
to GDP growth than has industry. 
  Almost three-quarters of the population 
lives in rural areas, which is substantially 
higher than the average for low-income Af-
rica. Average GDP per capita is particularly 
low in countries with less favorable agricul-
tural conditions, although there is substantial 
variation between landlocked and coastal 
countries within this group. More than 60 
percent of the less favored countries’ popu-
lation lives in poverty, with particularly high 
poverty in mineral-rich countries. Countries 
with less favorable agricultural conditions 
therefore face huge challenges and yet lack 
many of the resources of other African coun-
tries. However, despite poor conditions, ag-
riculture has and continues to offer the only 
opportunity for growth and poverty reduc-
tion for many of these countries. 
Country Case Studies 
The typology reveals the diversity of condi-
tions and challenges facing African coun-
tries, thus indicating the difficulty of draw-
ing general conclusions for the continent. 
Therefore, when considering the role of 
agriculture in Africa’s development, it is 
particularly important to account for such 
diversity. The remainder of this chapter ex-
amines the role of agriculture under differ-
ent initial conditions by selecting countries 
from the four different groups identified in 
the typology. In each case study country, the 
potential magnitude of the contribution of 
agriculture to growth and to poverty reduc-
tion is examined and contrasted with alter-
native sources of growth, using economy-
wide models that compare different structures 
of growth with their poverty outcomes. The 
selected case study countries include Ghana 
(coastal), Ethiopia and Uganda (landlocked), 
Zambia (mineral-rich), and Rwanda (less 
favorable agricultural conditions). 
Overview of the 
Case Study Countries
Both Ethiopia and Rwanda are landlocked 
and depend on rainfall for agricultural pro-
duction. Vulnerability to recurrent droughts 
has made Ethiopia one of the world’s poor-
est countries. Rwanda is still recovering from 
genocide, which caused a significant decline 
in its economy, including agriculture. In both 
countries, agriculture accounts for a sub-
stantial share of GDP, and more than four-
fifths of the population lives in rural areas 
(see Table 3.2). By contrast, manufacturing 
accounts for a small share of GDP and is 
dominated by agriculture-related processing. 
This is particularly true for Ethiopia, where 
industry generates only 11 percent of GDP, 
the lowest share in all low-income African 
countries. Although the service sector is 
large and has grown rapidly over the past 15 
years, much of this growth has been driven 
by the public sector, especially in the capital 
cities.
  By contrast, Ghana and Uganda have 
experienced high and stable GDP and agri-
cultural growth over a sustained period. 
Ghana in particular is one of only a handful 
of African countries to have consistently 
maintained a positive per capita GDP annual 
growth rate over the past 20 years. Ghana is 
also the only coastal country among the five 
case studies and has a relatively high share 
of industry to GDP owing to agroprocessing, 
textile manufacturing, and gold mining. How-
ever, agriculture still generates one-third of 
GDP. Within agriculture, crops and livestock 24   CHAPTER  3
account for three-quarters of agricultural 
production and are the primary activity of 
t w o - f i f t h s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  ( M c K a y  a n d  
Aryeetey 2004). 
  Agriculture contributes less to GDP in 
Zambia than it does in the other four case 
study countries. This circumstance reflects 
the country’s long-standing dependence on 
copper production and exports, which have 
fostered a dualistic economy biased toward 
urban-based industrialization. In addition to 
its vulnerability to volatile international prices, 
copper production is a capital-intensive, en-
clave industry with weak backward linkages 
into rural areas. Theref ore, gro wth dri v en 
by the mining sector has yet to provide the 
magnitude of poverty reduction needed in 
this impoverished country. 
  The five countries share not only a high 
concentration of poverty in rural areas, but 
also a history of bias against the agricultural 
sector that only recently has been reversed 
through policy reforms. For example, of a 
sample of 1 8 developing countries, Ghana 
had the highest level of discrimination against 
agriculture during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Krueger 1993: 61–73). Until the early 1980s, 
self-proclaimed socialist regimes in some of 
these five countries frequently espoused an 
attempt to use central planning to restruc-
ture the economy away from external de-
pendence. Food prices were kept low for 
vocal urban interests and to finance import-
substitution industrialization. Yet, rather than 
improving agricultural technology and fa-
cilitating the positive linkages of agriculture 
to the rest of the economy, the use of ineffi-
cient marketing boards, overvalued exchange 
rates, and pan-territorial pricing resulted in 
decelerating agricultural growth and reduc-
tions in farm incomes. Urban-biased policies 
were not only economically inefficient, but 
also financially unsustainable, particularly 
as international commodity prices for their 
traditional agricultural and mineral exports 
declined. The heavily subsidized and pro-
tected state-managed industries were highly 
inefficient and uncompetitive in both inter-
national and domestic markets, while stag-
nant agriculture resulted in growing food 
gaps in domestic markets and declines in 
agricultural exports. These conditions in-
duced foreign exchange constraints, higher 
food prices, and low savings, which them-
selves dampened the industrialization pro-
cess. Consequently, not only did agriculture 
suffer but so did other sectors in these 
economies. 
Table 3.2  Comparative indicators across the selected case study countries (%) 
  Share of GDP  GDP growth rate 
 (1999)  (1985–99)  Poverty  headcount
  Agriculture Industry Agriculture Total $1-a-day  National  rate
Ethiopia 52.3  11.1  2.7  1.8  85.2  51.1  44.2
          (1992/93)  (1999/2000)
Ghana 35.9 25.2  2.7 5.0  44.8  51.7 39.5
          (1991/92)  (1998/99)
Rwanda   40.5  21.6  3.2  1.8  58.9  40.0  60.3 
          (1983–85)  (1999/2001)
Uganda 36.4  20.9  3.5  9.0  40.8 56.0  35.0
          (1991/92)  (1999/2000)
Zambia 22.1  25.6  4.5 –0.3  79.3 68.9  75.4
          (1991)  (1998)
Sources:      World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005); UNIDO (2004); MOFED, Ethiopia (2003); GSS, 
Ghana (2004); MINECOFIN, Rwanda (2002); Okidi et al. (2004); Thurlow and Wobst (2004).THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA: SELECTED COUNTRY CASE STUDIES      25
  Precipitated by either economic crisis 
or political change, most of the case study 
countries adopted structural reforms during 
the 1980s and 1990s that were based on 
restoring macroeconomic stability and lib-
eralizing trade and domestic markets. Cor-
recting the adverse agricultural terms-of-
trade created under import substitution and 
reducing or eliminating export taxes on ag-
ricultural products have made the agricul-
tural sector one of the main beneficiaries of 
the reforms. Moreover, the typical devalua-
tion of the exchange rates helped eliminate 
the black market premium on export sectors. 
Although dismantling costly and inefficient 
parastatals provided farmers with improved 
incentives, the structural adjustment and 
privatization programs have left many small 
farmers without adequate access to key 
inputs and services, including farm credits 
(see, for example, Sahn, Dorosh, and Younger 
1997, for a detailed discussion about the im-
pact of structural adjustment programs on 
the poor in Africa). The outcome of long-
term, urban-biased investments and policies 
still influences the allocation of public re-
sources and investments, although the role 
of agriculture in growth and poverty re-
duction is increasingly being emphasized in 
these countries. 
  Nevertheless, the shift toward support 
for agriculture during the reform and adjust-
ment period, either indirectly through the re-
moval of adverse policies or directly through 
providing market support for targeted agri-
cultural commodities (such as price sup-
ports for cocoa in Ghana), has had a positive 
impact on agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction in these countries over the past 
decade. As seen in Table 3.3, the incidence 
of poverty has declined in four of the five 
countries at the national levels, except for 
Rwanda, where the economy was still recov-
ering from the genocide of 1994. In Zambia, 
poverty declines in rural regions were ac-
companied by poverty increases in urban 
areas owing to the shocks created by the 
collapse of copper prices and the collapse of 
state-supported urban industry under the 
structural adjustment process. 
  The potential contribution of agricul-
ture to poverty reduction in the five selected 
countries is analyzed using economywide 
models developed for each country. The fol-
lowing section describes the major features 
of the models and how microlevel poverty 
data are integrated with macrolevel growth 
data. 
Economywide Models and 
Data Sources 
The five country studies use economywide 
simulation models to examine the contribu-
tion of agriculture to growth and poverty 
reduction. Two different types of models are 
used: economywide multimarket (EMM) 
models for Ethiopia, Ghana, and Rwanda, 
and computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models for Uganda and Zambia. Although 
the CGE approach is preferable, the choice 
of methodology was constrained by the avail-
ability of the data for each country. Only 
in Uganda and Zambia were sufficient data 
available to construct the highly disaggre-
gated social accounting matrices necessary 
to calibrate the CGE models. However, de-
spite their differences, both types of models 
disaggregate the national economies into 
subnational provinces or regions so that the 
analysis of growth–poverty linkages can be 
conducted at the subnational level. For ex-
ample, in the remote regions where the rural 
economy is dominant and poverty levels are 
high, the growth–poverty linkages may be 
different than in regions with high levels of 
urbanization and concentrated industrial pro-
duction and urban employment. The models 
are described below, and a more detailed 
mathematical description is provided in the 
appendix.
Specification of the EMM Model. The 
EMM model captures the detailed struc-
ture of the agricultural sector. This can be 
seen in Table A3 in the appendix, where, for 
example, 34 sectors are identified in the 26   CHAPTER  3
Ethiopian model, 32 of which are in agricul-
ture. By contrast, the disaggregation of the 
CGE models is more evenly balanced across 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. For 
example, of the 27 sectors in the Zambian 
model, 13 are agricultural, 9 are industrial, 
and 5 are service sectors. Although the CGE 
models are better at capturing cross-  sector 
growth linkages during the production pro-
cess, they contain less detailed information 
on agriculture, such as the production tech-
nologies used in the many agricultural sub-
sectors. These differences may not prove too 
severe, however, because consumption link-
Table 3.3  Comparison of agricultural and nonagricultural growth scenarios
 Baseline  Agriculture-led  Nonagriculture-led
 scenario  scenario  scenarioa
Ethiopia (2003–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  0.5  2.4  2.4
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  3.1  5.0  5.0
  Agriculture  2.5  5.0  2.7
  Nonagriculture  3.7  5.0  7.0
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  44.3  26.5  37.3
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –15,904  –6,280
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  NA  –1.66  –0.73
Ghana (2003–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.2  3.1  3.1
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.7  5.7  5.7
  Agriculture  4.6  7.0  4.6
  Nonagriculture  4.8  4.8  6.2
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  23.7  17.3  21.5
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –1,722  –586
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –1.49  –1.78  –1.33
Rwanda (2003–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  0.7  3.2  3.2
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  3.4  6.0  6.0
  Agriculture  3.3  7.9  3.5
  Nonagriculture  3.4  3.5  8.1
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  55.5  34.6  43.3
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –2,280  –1,334
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –1.09  –1.41  –0.84
Uganda (1999–2015)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  1.6  2.8  2.8
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  5.2  6.4  6.4
  Agriculture  5.1  7.6  5.3
  Nonagriculture  5.3  5.2  7.4
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  27.8  17.6  21.7
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –3,993  –2,388
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –0.98  –1.58  –1.10
Zambia (2001–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.0  3.0  3.0
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.0  5.0  5.0
  Agriculture  4.6  7.7  4.5
  Nonagriculture  3.8  4.0  5.1
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  68.3  58.9  64.4
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –1,253  –529
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –0.35  –0.58  –0.38
Source: Authors’ simulations and calculations.
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ages outweigh production linkages in most 
developing countries during their early stages 
of development (Vogel 1994). The ability to 
capture detailed consumption linkages de-
pends largely on the disaggregation of house-
holds’ income and expenditure patterns. In 
this regard, all of the models have highly 
disaggregated representative households and 
are linked directly to household expenditure 
surveys to ensure that the most detailed 
household information is retained. The 
models are disaggregated further across 
regions within each country to capture the 
geographic heterogeneity of sectors and 
households. For example, 56 zones are in-
cluded in the Ethiopian EMM model. In this 
regard, the EMM models are considerably 
more disaggregated than the CGE models.
  The EMM model is based on neoclas-
sical microeconomic theory. In the model, 
there are aggregate producers representing 
subnational production in each sector and 
for rural and urban areas. The supply func-
tions are derived under producer profit maxi-
mization based on the producer prices of all 
commodities. In the agricultural sector, these 
supply functions have two subcomponents: 
(1) yield functions and (2) land allocation 
functions responsive to changing profit-
ability across different crops given the total 
available land. Where data are available, the 
supply functions are disaggregated further 
across technologies. In the case of the Ethi-
opian EMM model, there are as many as 15 
different technologies for producing similar 
crops or livestock products within specific 
subnational regions. For example, the yield 
functions for farmers employing modern in-
puts, such as fertilizer or improved seeds, 
have higher productivity coefficients than 
those not using modern inputs. The area 
functions for each crop are also disaggre-
gated according to the use of modern inputs. 
For example, the area functions for maize 
production include farmers using fertilizer 
only, those using fertilizer and improved 
seeds, or those not using any modern inputs. 
Further, since irrigation is treated as one of 
these modern inputs, there are different sup-
ply functions for irrigated and rainfed crop 
production. 
  Representative consumers are aggregated 
from household survey data to represent an 
average household’s consumption patterns 
in rural and urban areas of each subnational 
region. The demand functions are derived 
from utility maximization based on prices 
and income. Income is generated from both 
agricultural and nonagricultural activities 
and is an endogenous variable that links 
supply with demand as in a typical general 
equilibrium model.
  As the name of the model suggests, a 
multiple market structure is specified. There 
is perfect substitution between domestically 
and internationally produced commodities. 
However, transportation and other market 
costs distinguish trade in the domestic mar-
ket from imports and exports. For example, 
although imported maize is assumed to be 
perfectly substitutable with domestically pro-
duced maize in consumers’ demand func-
tions, maize may still not be profitable to 
import if its domestic price is lower than 
the import parity price less any transactions 
costs. Maize imports can occur only when 
domestic demand for maize grows faster 
than domestic supply and the local market 
price rises significantly. A similar situation 
applies to exported commodities. Even 
though certain horticultural products are 
exportable, if domestic production is not 
competitive in international markets, owing 
to either low productivity or high transac-
tions costs, then exports will not be profit-
able. Only when domestic producer prices 
plus market costs are lower than the export 
parity price of the same product does it be-
come profitable to export. 
  The model does not capture bilateral 
trade flows across subnational regions, al-
though it does identify subnational regions as 
being food surplus or deficit by comparing 
regional level demand and supply for total 
food commodities. Although producers and 
consumers in different regions operate in the 
same national markets for specific commodi-
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differences in transportation and market 
costs. For example, in the Ethiopian EMM 
model, domestic marketing margins are de-
fined at the regional level according to the 
distance to Addis Ababa, which represents 
the central market for the country. For a 
food surplus region, food crop prices faced 
by local producers are equal to the prices in 
the central market subtracting market mar-
gins, while for a food deficit region local 
prices are higher than those in the central 
market owing to marketing margins. 
  To analyze the growth–poverty effect, 
the nationally defined poverty line is adopt  ed 
in the models rather than using the World 
Bank’s dollar-a-day measure. National pov-
erty lines are typically measured by total 
household expenditure, since household in-
come is often significantly underreported 
in developing countries. However, changes 
in the representative households’ expendi-
tures in the EMM and CGE models are the 
results of changes in their incomes (that is, 
both expenditures and incomes are endoge-
nous variables in the models).
  A microsimulation model is used to cap-
ture detailed household consumption patterns. 
More specifically, all sampled households in 
the household living standard and monetary 
survey are used to construct the microsimu-
lation model that links with their corre-
sponding representative consumers in the 
EMM model, which in turn are defined 
across subnational regions and for both rural 
and urban areas. A top-down linkage is de-
fined from the EMM model to the micro-
simulation model. For example, if the results 
from Ethiopian EMM model find that a 
1 percent increase in GDP causes 1.3 per-
cent increase in annual spending on teff for 
the household in the EMM model represent-
ing the Ethipoian region “rural West Tigray,” 
then there will be 1.3 percent increase in 
spending on teff by each of the 143 sample 
households it represents in the microsimu-
lation model. However, the share of teff in 
each of the 143 households’ total expendi-
ture varies. Therefore, 1.3 percent increase in 
teff expenditure will affect each of the 143 
households differently depending on the 
share of teff in their consumption basket. As 
a result, the effect on total household expen-
diture will be larger for households spend-
ing a larger share of their income on teff. 
These differential effects occur across all 
commodities in the EMM model. Accord-
ing to these differential effects, the EMM-
microsimulation models are able to estimate 
national or regional income distributional 
change.
  In general, because of the larger share of 
staple food in poor households’ budgets, the 
same income elasticity for all rural house-
holds can result in different aggregate effects 
on total expenditures across households. 
Given a fixed poverty line defined by real 
expenditure, some poor households whose 
per capita expenditure is initially below the 
poverty line may move out of poverty in 
certain years if their expenditure rises above 
the poverty line. Using the microsimulation 
model, the national poverty rates are recal-
culated according to updated total expendi-
ture for each sample household for each year 
in a simulation.
Specification of the CGE Model. The 
growth–poverty relationship is examined in 
Uganda and Zambia using CGE and micro-
simulation models. As mentioned earlier, an 
important factor determining the contribu-
tion of agriculture and industry to overall 
economic growth are the linkages between 
these sectors and the rest of the economy. 
The proponents of agriculture argue that ag-
riculture has strong growth linkages. Con-
sumption linkages are captured in the CGE 
model by defining a set of nested constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
functions that allow producers to generate 
demand for both factors and intermediates. 
Moreover, the CGE models capture both 
forward and backward production linkages 
between agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors. To reflect the heterogeneity of pro-
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are calibrated to highly disaggregated social 
accounting matrices (SAMs) that distinguish 
between producers in different sectors and 
regions, and the various commodities that 
they produce. As in the EMM models, these 
commodities are traded within national 
markets (that is, the model does not explic-
itly capture interregional trade). The model 
differentiates the factors of production, 
including capital and subnational region-
  specific land and labor. Labor is disaggre-
gated across regions, gender, and education. 
Land and labor are fully employed, earn 
flexible returns under fixed supply, and are 
mobile across sectors. Regional labor mar-
kets allow low-skilled workers to migrate 
within but not across regions. By contrast, 
higher-skilled workers are mobile across 
regions. Capital is sector specific and earns 
flexible activity-specific profits. The de-
tailed specification of production and factor 
markets in the models allows them to cap-
ture the changing scale and technology of 
production across sectors and subnational 
regions, and therefore how changes in a 
country’s structure of growth influences its 
distribution of incomes. 
  Another area of the debate on the role 
of agriculture and industry relates to inter-
national trade. Some suggest that import 
competition may have undermined the growth 
linkages of agriculture and that food im-
ports reduce the need for investment in do-
mestic agriculture. The CGE models capture 
both import competition and export oppor-
tunities by allowing producers and con-
sumers to shift between domestic and for-
eign markets depending on changes in the 
relative prices of imports, exports, and do-
mestic goods. More specifically, the decision 
of producers to supply domestic or foreign 
markets is governed by a constant elasticity 
of transformation (CET) function, while 
substitution possibilities exist between im-
ports and domestically supplied goods under 
a CES Armington specification. In this way, 
the model captures how import competition 
and the changing export opportunities of 
agriculture and industry can strengthen or 
weaken the linkages between growth and 
poverty.
  A third area in the debate concerns the 
relative importance of agriculture and in-
dustry in generating household livelihoods 
and how this has changed over time. Income 
and expenditure patterns vary considerably 
across households, especially across geo-
graphic regions and rural and urban areas. 
These differences are important for distri-
butional change, since the incomes gener-
ated by agriculture and industry will accrue 
to different households depending on their 
location and factor endowments. To capture 
these differences, the CGE model follows 
the EMM model by distinguishing between 
different representative households, each of 
which is an aggregation of a group of house-
holds in the underlying household living 
standard and monetary survey. Households 
in the CGE model receive income through 
the employment of their factors in both 
agricultural and nonagricultural production, 
and then pay taxes, save, and make transfers 
to other households. The disposable income 
of a representative household is allocated 
to commodity consumption derived from a 
Stone–Geary utility function (that is, a lin-
ear expenditure system of demand). As with 
the EMM model and to retain as much in-
formation on households’ income and expen-
diture patterns as possible, the CGE model 
is linked to a microsimulation module based 
on the household survey. Endogenous changes 
in each commodity’s consumption for each 
aggregate household in the CGE model are 
used to adjust the level of commodity ex-
penditure of the corresponding households 
in the survey. Real consumption levels are 
then recalculated in the survey and standard 
poverty measures are estimated via this up-
dated expenditure measure. 
  The models make a number of assump-
tions about how the Ugandan and Zambian 
economies maintain macroeconomic bal-
ance. These “closure rules” concern the 
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or public sector account, and the savings-
investment account. For the current account, 
a flexible exchange rate maintains a fixed 
level of foreign savings. This assumption 
implies that governments cannot simply in-
crease foreign debt but have to generate ex-
port earnings to pay for imported goods and 
services. Although this assumption realisti-
cally limits the degree of import competition 
in the domestic market, it also underlines 
the importance of the agricultural and in-
dustrial export sectors. For the government 
account, tax rates and real consumption ex-
penditure are exogenously determined, leav-
ing the fiscal deficit to adjust to ensure that 
public expenditures equal receipts. For the 
savings-investment account, real investment 
adjusts to changes in savings (that is, savings-
driven investment). These two assumptions 
allow the models to capture the negative 
crowding-out effects of falling government 
revenues when the structure of growth shifts 
toward lower tax paying sectors such as 
agriculture.
  Finally, the CGE models are recursive 
dynamic, which means that some exogenous 
stock variables in the models are updated 
each period based on results from previous 
periods. The models are run over the period 
to 2015, with each equilibrium period rep-
resenting a single year.11 The models also 
capture exogenous demographic and tech-
nological change. Changes in the population, 
labor supply, human capital, and total factor 
productivity (TFP) are based on projections 
that account for the effects of HIV/AIDS 
on labor supply, productivity, and household 
populations. Capital accumulation occurs 
through endogenous linkages with previous-
period investment. Although the allocation 
of newly invested capital is influenced by 
each sector’s initial share of gross operating 
surplus, the final allocation depends on de-
preciation and sector profit-rate differentials. 
Sectors with above-average returns in the 
previous period receive a larger share of the 
new capital stock in the current period. 
  In summary, the CGE models incorpo-
rate distributional change by (1) disaggre-
gating growth across provinces and sectors, 
(2) capturing employment effects through 
factor markets and price effects through 
commodity markets, and (3) translating these 
two effects onto each household in the sur-
vey according to its unique factor endow-
ment and income and expenditure patterns. 
The structure of the growth–poverty rela-
tionship is therefore defined explicitly ex ante 
based on observed country-specific struc-
tures and behavior. This procedure allows 
the models to capture the distributional 
change associated with growth in agricul-
ture and industry.
Agricultural Growth Is More 
Pro-Poor than Is Industrial Growth
A baseline scenario is first simulated in 
which the five case study countries are as-
sumed to continue growing according to 
current trends until 2015. These trends in-
clude not only the level of aggregate eco-
nomic growth but also its sectoral composi-
tion.12 I t  i s  w i d e l y  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  m o s t  
African countries are unlikely to meet with 
the first Millennium Development Goal of 
halving poverty by 2015 unless their growth 
performance improves dramatically. Taking 
Ethiopia as an example, the model’s base-
line scenario shows that if the current level 
and composition of growth are maintained, 
then the poverty headcount rate is likely to 
remain unchanged at around 44.3 percent by 
2015 (cf. Table 3.4). Ethiopia therefore needs 
to not only accelerate the level of growth, 
but also find ways in which to enhance the 
“pro-poorness” of growth. In other words, it 
11The Ugandan and Zambian models are calibrated to 1999 and 2001 SAMs respectively.
12The CGE models are calibrated further to match observed trends on the demand side of growth and for key 
macroeconomic indicators (for example, physical/human capital accumulation, current account changes, and 
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needs to identify the kind or composition 
of growth that is most effective at reducing 
poverty and that raises the poverty–growth 
elasticity. In the context of the current de-
bate, it is necessary to consider the relative 
importance of agriculture and industry in 
helping Africa achieve its development ob-
jective of significantly reducing poverty. 
  The models are used to examine how 
differences in the structure of growth in each 
of the five case study countries influence 
the rate of poverty reduction. More specifi-
cally, two simulations are presented in which 
agricultural and industrial growth are ac-
celerated separately and the effectiveness of 
this additional growth in reducing poverty is 
Table 3.4  Comparison of staples and exportable agricultural growth scenarios
 Baseline  Staple-crops-led  Export-crops-led
 scenario  scenario  scenario
Ethiopia (2003–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  0.5  2.4  2.4
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  3.1  5.0  5.0
  Agriculture  2.5  5.0  5.0
   Staple  crops  and  livestock  2.0  5.0  1.9
   Export  crops  4.0  4.4  18.0
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  44.3  27.2  31.6
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –15,279  –11,313
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  NA  –1.80  –1.40
Ghana (2003–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.2  3.4  3.4
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.7  6.0  6.0
  Agriculture  4.6  7.7  7.7
   Staple  crops  and  livestock  4.6  8.5  3.7
   Export  crops  4.1  3.4  18.4
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  23.7  14.0  22.9
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –2,615  –211
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –1.50  –2.10  –1.10
Uganda (1999–2015)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)     
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  5.2  6.4  6.4
  Agriculture  5.1  7.7  7.9
   Staple  crops  5.1  9.0  5.0
   Export  crops  4.4  –1.6  19.7
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  27.8  18.6  19.0
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –3,602  –3,445
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –0.98  –1.40  –1.39
Zambia (2001–15)     
  Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)     
  Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.0  5.0  5.0
  Agriculture  4.6  7.8  7.1
   Staple  crops  4.1  7.9  4.0
   Export  crops  10.2  6.9  22.8
  Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  68.3  59.2  62.0
  Difference in poor population in 2015 (1,000)    –1,210  –842
 Poverty–growth  elasticity  –0.35  –0.57  –0.47
Source: Authors’ simulations and calculations.
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compared. To make the results comparable, 
poverty–growth elasticities are calculated 
for each scenario in the five countries.13 
Table 3.3 shows that the poverty–growth 
elasticity is consistently larger when addi-
tional growth is driven by agricultural rather 
than nonagricultural sectors. Again taking 
Ethiopia as an example, a 1 percent annual 
increase in per capita GDP driven by agri-
culture-led growth leads to 1.66 percent 
reduction in the poverty headcount rate per 
year. By contrast, a similar increase in per 
capita GDP driven by nonagricultural sec-
tors leads to only a 0.73 percent fall in the 
poverty rate. These disparities in poverty–
growth elasticities can translate into signifi-
cantly different reductions in the poverty 
headcount over time. For example, with 
similar GDP growth, the poverty headcount 
in Ethiopia falls to 26.5 percent under the 
agricultural-led growth scenario compared 
with 37.3 percent under the nonagriculture-
led growth scenario. Given its larger impact 
on poverty, agriculture-led growth in Ethio-
pia lifts an additional 9.6 million people out 
of poverty compared to nonagriculture-led 
growth, despite the fact that overall GDP 
grows at the similar rate under the two sce-
narios. These findings are consistent across 
the five countries studied. Given a similar 
GDP growth rate, the calculated poverty–
growth elasticities are always higher under 
the agriculture-led scenario. However, the 
magnitudes of these differences vary across 
countries. 
  The poverty–growth elasticities are en-
dogenous outcomes from the model results. 
Growth affects individuals differently owing 
to heterogeneity across regions and house-
holds. With different income sources and 
locations within a country, changes in in-
come and consumption across households 
differ considerably from average changes 
at the national level (that is, per capita GDP 
or total consumption). To capture growth–
poverty linkages within a country, it is nec-
essary to capture changes in the distribution 
of incomes, which are determined primarily 
by country-specific initial conditions. For ex-
ample, in some countries, agriculture gener-
ates a large share of national GDP and many 
households live in rural regions dominated 
by agriculture. For these households, partic-
ipation in agricultural activities is often the 
major source of income, and hence they are 
likely to benefit more from agriculture-led 
growth than nonagricultural growth. House-
holds with greater opportunities to work in 
the urban sector or who can take advantage 
of nearby city markets to produce higher-
value agricultural products, may concen-
trate closer to urban centers and be better 
positioned to benefit from nonagricultural 
sectors or export agriculture. Since such 
households are usually less poor than re-
moter households, economic growth driven 
by nonagricultural sectors may have less im-
pact on poverty reduction. For example, ac-
cording to the Rwandan national household 
survey conducted in 2000–01, agriculture 
accounts for 50 percent of household in-
come at the national level, whereas it ac-
counts for 75 percent for the average poor 
household. The importance of agricultural 
incomes is even higher in poorer regions 
of the country. Under such circumstances, 
agricultural growth is expected to be more 
pro-poor than nonagricultural growth be-
13The poverty–growth elasticity used in this study measures the responsiveness of the poverty rate to changes 
in the per capita GDP growth rate. The formula for this elasticity is:
  ∆P0/P0  ∆P0  GDPpc ———————– = ————⋅———–,
 ∆GDPpc/GDPpc  ∆GDPpc  P0
where ∆PO and ∆GDPpc are average annual changes (from the base year) in the poverty headcount rate and 
level of per capita GDP; and P0 and GDPpc are the base-year poverty headcount rate and per capita GDP. The 
poverty–growth elasticity measures the percentage change in the poverty headcount rate caused by a 1 percent 
increase in per capita GDP. This is not equivalent to a percentage point change in the poverty headcount rate.THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA: SELECTED COUNTRY CASE STUDIES      33
cause it is a more important income source 
for the poor. 
  Agricultural growth can also benefit 
urban and landless or net food-buyer rural 
households if rising agricultural productivity 
lowers food prices. This reduction in price 
is particularly important for poor urban and 
rural households for whom food purchases 
are major items in their expenditure baskets. 
For example, Ethiopia’s 1999–2000 national 
household survey showed that poor urban 
households on average spend more than 50 
percent of their total income on staple foods, 
which is higher than the corresponding 30 
percent for all urban households.
  Therefore, the initial conditions in each 
country are the primary factors determining 
the size of the poverty–growth elasticity. 
However, it should be noted that the models’ 
assumptions can also affect this elasticity, 
given that it is calculated ex ante from the 
model simulations (as opposed to ex post 
estimations from survey data). For example, 
the assumption on the labor market (that is, 
labor mobility across regions and between 
rural and urban areas) can affect whether 
growth is shared by a majority of the popu-
lation. Assuming perfect labor markets and 
full employment implies that rural house-
holds, whether they are poor or not, can 
equally benefit from urban growth by mi-
grating to urban areas and participating in 
urban-based nonagricultural sectors. If there 
are imperfect labor markets in certain re-
gions, especially those dominated by rural 
areas, then poor or rural households have 
fewer opportunities to participate in urban-
based growth.14 Admittedly, these assump-
tions, which are often country specific, make 
it more difficult to compare results across 
the five countries. However, it is reasonable 
to compare the poverty–growth elasticities 
produced by the models within a country, 
since these scenarios are conducted using the 
same model, poverty line, and underlying 
assumptions. 
  The large gap between the poverty–
growth elasticities in the two scenarios re-
ported in Table 3.3 indicates the relative im-
portance of agricultural growth, especially 
for poorer rural households. The proponents 
of agriculture suggest that the large size of 
the agricultural sector in most African coun-
tries means that this sector is able to con-
tribute significantly to aggregate growth. 
However, a small agricultural share of GDP, 
as is the case in Zambia, does not imply that 
the agricultural sector is less important for 
generating pro-poor growth. Zambia’s eco-
nomic structure partly reflects the country’s 
long-standing dependence on copper produc-
tion and exports, which has fostered a dual 
economy biased in favor of urban-based in-
dustrialization. Copper mining is a capital-
intensive enclave industry with few backward 
linkages to rural areas. Therefore, growth 
driven by this sector does not provide the 
magnitude of poverty reduction needed in 
this impoverished country. The model sim-
ulations for Zambia show that growth in 
the nonagricultural sector, even including the 
non-mining industrial sectors, is less effec-
tive at reducing poverty than an agricultural-
led growth strategy. As seen in Table 3.3, 
growth in the nonagricultural sector would 
reduce poverty to 64.4 percent by 2015 com-
pared with 58.9 percent by the same year 
under an agriculture-led growth scenario.
Broad-Based Agricultural 
Growth Is More Pro-Poor than 
Is Export-Led Growth
In recent years, traditional and nontraditional 
export agriculture has grown rapidly in many 
African countries, and these high-value crops 
have often received the most policy support 
from the governments. In Ghana, for ex-
ample, the cocoa sector has historically re-
ceived considerable support, despite the higher 
prevalence of poverty among food crop 
farmers. Even with the agricultural reforms 
implemented at the end of the 1980s, the 
14Detailed descriptions of the assumptions underlying the various models are provided in the appendix.34   CHAPTER  3
cocoa sector has still received priority atten-
tion over food crops. Although such high-
value agriculture may have greater potential 
for growth, its contribution to overall eco-
nomic growth may not be sufficient within 
the foreseeable future, given its small initial 
base in most African countries. Moreover, 
growth in high-value export crops may only 
reach those farmers with better urban and/
or foreign market access and will therefore 
have little impact on the food costs of the 
poor. 
  In Ethiopia, cereals, pulses, root crops, 
and oil crops make up almost 65 percent of 
agriculture. Along with livestock production, 
a majority of Ethiopia’s poor depend heavily 
on cultivating these staple crops. The same 
is true in Rwanda, where the share of staple 
crops and livestock in the agricultural sec-
tor’s total output is as high as 90 percent. By 
contrast, the shares of staples and livestock 
in the other three case study countries are 
relatively low, but are still as high as 70 per-
cent of Ghana’s agricultural total output, 
54 percent in Uganda, and 65 percent in 
Zambia.
  The degree to which different agricul-
tural subsectors can contribute to growth and 
poverty reduction varies considerably. This 
subsection evaluates two broad groups of ag-
ricultural subsectors in terms of the effec-
tiveness of their growth to reduce poverty: 
staple crops and livestock, and traditional 
and nontraditional export crops. An empiri-
cal method is used that utilizes the economy-
wide models which determine the poverty 
reduction resulting from accelerating growth 
in each of the two sectors.
  Assuming similar growth rates at the 
subsector level, greater economywide growth 
will obviously be generated by the larger 
subsector, in turn producing a (generally) 
larger effect on poverty. On the other hand, 
small subsectors, such as nontraditional ex-
port crops, may have greater capacity to 
grow rapidly and may require lower levels 
of investment to do so. Thus, in determining 
whether a subsector will ultimately drive 
growth, both the linkage effects on the econ-
omy and poverty as well as the growth po-
tential (determined by supply and demand 
factors) must be considered. To ensure that 
the two simulations are comparable despite 
having different initial contributions to GDP, 
it is necessary to accelerate growth in each 
subsector until a similar growth rate is 
achieved at the aggregate level. Taking Zam-
bia as an example, for export crops alone to 
generate an additional 1 percent annual 
growth in aggregate GDP (that is, from 4 to 
5 percent), the shares of these crops would 
have to grow at 23 percent per year because 
this subsector is initially very small (see 
Table 3.4). By contrast, the staples sector 
is substantially larger and so does not have 
to grow as rapidly to achieve the same ad-
ditional 1 percent annual growth in GDP. 
Similarly, to achieve 5 percent growth in 
annual agricultural GDP in Ethiopia, the 
required growth rate for the staple crops is 
5 percent if additional agricultural growth is 
driven by these crops alone. However, it re-
quires 18 percent annual growth for export 
crops to achieve the same agricultural growth 
rate. Such high growth requirements for ex-
port crops are valid in each of the five case 
study countries. Although these sectors un-
doubtedly have considerable growth poten-
tial, it is reasonable to question whether such 
high growth rates in any agricultural sub-
sector are feasible over a sustained period of 
10 to 15 years.
  Growth in staple crops is not only neces-
sary for agricultural and overall economic 
growth, but it also can lead to strongly pro-
poor outcomes because of its broad base. The 
model simulations show that even if ex-
tremely high growth in export crops is pos-
sible, it leads to much smaller poverty–growth 
elasticities. For example, if the same 5 per-
cent agricultural GDP growth rate in Ethio-
pia is driven by the staples sector, then the 
national poverty rate is likely to fall to 27 
percent by 2015. This is 4.4 percentage points 
lower than the poverty rate expected under 
the agricultural-export-led scenario with a 
similar agricultural growth of 5 percent. 
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gregate growth rate, accelerated staples-led 
growth will be able to lift an additional 4 
million people out of poverty by 2015.
  Even though growth in Africa’s staples 
sector can pla y a cri tical role in reducing 
poverty, past growth in this sector has typi-
cally arisen from area expansion. Many Af-
rican countries were considered self-sufficient 
in food crop production until the 1970s and 
there seemed to be no pressing need to pay 
special attention to the food sector. With no 
permanent food problem and with virgin 
lands still available in most countries, the 
pressure to change established ways of pro-
duction (and accompanying social insti-
tutions) was low. The situation has changed 
dramatically over the past three decades. 
Africa’s population has quadrupled since the 
1950s and is projected to more than double 
between 2000 and 2050. Expansion of arable 
land has stagnated in recent years, indicat-
ing that land frontiers may have been reached 
(Sida 2006). The result is mounting popula-
tion pressure and declining farm sizes. The 
land constraint has become more serious in 
the countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, 
where the distribution of land among a ma-
jority of small farms appears to be worse 
than those of many Asian countries at the 
time of their green revolutions. 
  It is reasonable to argue that in such a 
situation, intensification of food agriculture 
ought to take place. However, so far extensi-
fication has still been a more practical option 
in large parts of Africa. An extensive liter-
ature identifies the key factors capable of 
increasing staple sector productivity. Many 
studies find that declines in the provision of 
credit from the banking sector and low ac-
cessibility to modern inputs are among the 
main factors affecting incentives to intensify 
farming. These constraints often arise when 
input subsidies are removed during liberal-
ization and are not replaced by appropriate 
market-oriented institutions and policy in-
struments. Such problems tend to be more 
serious in more remote rural areas domi-
nated by subsistence production. For ex-
ample, the population in Ghana’s arid rural 
savannah relies almost entirely on subsis-
tence production with little agroprocess-
ing, few opportunities for diversifying into 
nonfarm income, and weak infrastructure. 
Therefore, despite relatively high levels of 
national growth in Ghana, this region expe-
rienced only a slight decline in its poverty 
headcount. 
  A number of survey-based studies have 
identified the potential for the intensifica-
tion of food crop production in Africa. In 
each of the five case study countries, there 
is evidence of farms or regions that have 
achieved crop yields substantially above the 
national average. For example, based on a 
survey of 13,000 rural households in Ethio-
pia, we found the highest maize yield to 
be around 7.8 tons per hectare and that 
5 percent of households generated yields 
twice the national average of 1.8 tons per 
hectare. Sida (2006) conducted surveys of 
3,000 smallholders in eight African coun-
tries (including Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, 
and Zambia) and showed yields as high as 
10 tons per hectare for maize, 3.5 tons per 
hectare for rice, 2 tons per hectare for sor-
ghum, and 16 to 28 tons per hectare for 
cassava (Sida 2006: 37). Further, a number 
of countries have experienced significant 
increases in land productivity at the national 
level, such as in Burkina Faso, where major 
food crops yields have risen dramatically 
over the last 40 years. Many other studies 
in Africa support the finding that intensifi-
cation has occurred in certain regions and 
among certain categories of farmers (Turner, 
Hyden, and Kates 1993; Snrech 1995; Wig-
gins 2000; Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade 
2001; Haggbalde et al. 2003). Therefore, 
although Africa has not achieved its green 
revolution, there are numerous examples 
where the intensification of food crop pro-
duction has been achieved.
  Transforming individual success stories 
into broader agricultural development re-
mains a challenge. Several studies have 
identified preconditions for agricultural 
transformation—the most important of which 
is ensuring the commitment of African 36   CHAPTER  3
governments to invest in agriculture. Since 
its inception, the Africa Union (AU) has 
placed agriculture at the top of its agenda. 
The seriousness of this commitment is re-
flected in its urging member states to in-
crease annual allocations to agriculture to at 
least 10 percent of national budgets and in 
its approval of the Comprehensive Africa Ag-
riculture Development Program (CAADP) 
under the New Partnership for Africa’s De-
velopment (NEPAD). However, regional com-
mitments need to be realized at the country 
level to achieve the agricultural growth nec-
essary to significantly reduce poverty and 
encourage economic transformation. 
  Innovations in science and technology 
are both a precondition and a part of agri-
cultural transformation. African farmers need 
technologies applicable to their diversified 
agroecological conditions to counter erratic 
rainfall and declining soil fertility. While 
technologies suitable for African agriculture 
are crucial to shift agricultural growth from 
land expansion to intensification, Africa’s 
green revolution should not overly rely on a 
“package of technology.” This is an incor-
rect interpretation of Asia’s green revolu-
tion, where the private sector and small-
holders played important roles (Sida 2006). 
Agricultural intensification also involves the 
development of supply chains around small-
holder farmers, such as the presence of input 
markets, seasonal finance, and marketing 
systems to increase farm production and 
deliver goods to consumers at competitive 
prices (Poulton et al. 2006). A lack of prof-
itable opportunities in food production for 
small-scale agriculture will deter the private 
sector during the earlier stages of develop-
ment. As such, to reduce costs and mitigate 
risks, public investments are needed in agri-
cultural research and in market and institu-
tional development. There is broad agree-
ment that increased investment in key public 
goods is required to revitalize agricultural 
development. For most African countries, 
however, public investment is still a small 
share of the government’s budget—a share 
that has remained stagnant or even declined 
over the past decade (Fan and Rao 2003). 
For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, agricul-
tural spending accounted for only 2.8 per-
cent of total government spending in 2004, 
which falls far short of the 10 percent target 
identified by African leaders in the 2003 
Maputo Declaration. This share has also de-
clined from 3.2 percent in 1994.15 Further, 
the gap between Africa and other parts of the 
developing world is even wider if we con-
sider the ratio of agricultural spending to 
agricultural GDP. This ratio was 5.3 percent 
for Africa as a whole in 2004, whereas it 
was 11.2 percent and 6.2 percent in Asia and 
Latin America, respectively. 
  The positive role of public investments 
in agricultural research and development and 
in rural infrastructure on the agricultural 
growth has been econometrically estimated. 
Drawing on 294 studies that estimate the re-
turns to agricultural research and develop-
m e n t  ( i n c l u d i n g  e x t e n s i o n ) ,  A l s t o n  e t  a l .  
(1998a) found a wide range of rates of return 
to research, but that the annual rate averaged 
73 percent. Evidence from rural Uganda in-
dicates that public investment in agricultural 
research had the highest impact on poverty 
reduction during the 1990s (Fan and Rao 
2004). In addition to financial resources, 
agricultural innovation requires human cap-
ital, and therefore sustaining and improving 
on advances in agricultural research requires 
concurrent investments in general education 
(Hayami and Ruttan 1985). 
  Public investment in rural infrastructure 
is also necessary to increase consumer de-
mand and farmers’ access to input and out-
put markets, stimulate the rural nonfarm 
economy and rural towns, and more fully 
integrate the poorest regions into their coun-
tries’ economies. Spencer (1994) estimated 
15On the other hand, agricultural spending accounted for 8.1 percent of total government spending for Asian 
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the density of rural roads in Africa to be well 
below that of Asia at the time of its green 
revolution. Substantial investments are there-
fore needed to raise roads and other basic 
rural infrastructures to the levels required 
for agricultural development (U.N. Millen-
nium Development Project 2005). As Fan, 
Zhang, and Rao (2004) showed in rural 
Uganda, infrastructure investments do not 
have to be excessive to have sizeable im-
pacts. Indeed, investments in feeder roads 
reduced the number of poor Ugandans by 
more than three times as much as invest-
ments in more costly murram or tarmac 
roads. Public investment in rural infrastruc-
ture also demonstrates a “crowding-in” ef-
fect on private investment, which, in the 
absence of rural infrastructure, is much less 
profitable (Timmer 2002). The importance 
of infrastructure is supported by the Ethio-
pian and Zambian economy-wide models, 
which suggest that if agricultural growth 
is combined with a lowering of transaction 
costs through public investments, then pov-
erty reduction would be substantially im-
proved (Thurlow and Wobst 2004; Diao et 
al. 2005). Reducing marketing costs benefits 
smallholders primarily via the increased 
prices they receive for their goods, increas-
ing their income from the same level of out-
put. Moreover, improving market conditions 
creates a more efficient trading sector (as 
part of the service sector), which itself can 
generate greater nonagricultural income at 
constant costs. As a result of these cross-
sector linkages and positive price effects, not 
only can growth in the agricultural sector be 
stimulated, but in addition the pro-poor ef-
fect of the resulting growth is much stronger 
in rural areas where the infrastructure and 




conomic theory, cross-country empirical studies, and the success of the green revolu-
tion in Asia all confirm that agriculture can play a critical role in the development pro-
cess. Indeed, in much of the development literature, agricultural growth has been 
viewed as a precondition for industrialization because the sector provides surplus labor to 
industry, savings for capital investment in nonagricultural sectors, and more food to meet the 
increasing demand of a growing nonagricultural labor force, without which labor costs in the 
industrial sector must rise. As agriculture is the largest employer in most developing countries, 
growth in the sector also has a large impact on poverty reduction by creating income opportu-
nities for the poor in both the farm and nonfarm economy while lowering food prices for poor 
rural and urban consumers. By increasing food security, agriculture also improves nutrition 
and in turn promotes productivity. At the same time, it decreases a country’s dependence on 
imported food, which often cannot be obtained without sufficient and stable levels of foreign 
exchange. Finally, the unique decision-making processes associated with smallholder agricul-
ture can stimulate broader growth by fostering the processes of learning and innovation.
  The pro-growth and pro-poor performance of agriculture depends on the broad participa-
tion of small farmers. Small farms dominate agriculture in many developing countries, and 
the transformation from traditional to modern agriculture is based on the efficiency of small 
farms and their transformation from subsistence to market activities. In an increasingly global-
ized world, however, small farms face a number of new challenges in terms of accessing mar-
ket opportunities. Particularly in Africa, where an agricultural transformation comparable to 
Asia’s or Latin America’s has yet to occur, there is skepticism about whether an agriculture-led 
strategy in general, and a small farms one in particular, is a viable approach. Nevertheless, 
there is little evidence or theory in the African context for the superiority of alternative strate-
gies, such as developing large-scale commercial agriculture, bypassing agriculture straight to 
industrialization, or encouraging a mass migration from rural to urban areas. Indeed, propo-
nents of such strategies fail to explain how they will tackle the rising food costs and high urban 
un- and underemployment that would inevitably result in countries with small and insulated 
industrial sectors. 
  The importance of agriculture as a driving force for African development is highlighted in 
the typology presented in Table 3.1. More than 70 percent of low-income African countries 
have favorable agricultural conditions, and agriculture comprises more than a third of GDP in 
two-thirds of these countries. Even in countries where agriculture is a smaller component of 
GDP, smallholder farming often represents the dominant livelihood for the poorest house-
holds. By examining the experience of five countries during the 1990s, some commonalities 
emerged despite variations in the countries’ development levels and mineral resource endow-
ments. Confirming much of the development theory discussed in Chapter 2, agricultural growth CONCLUSIONS   39
in these countries creates greater linkages 
and hence generates more poverty reduction 
than growth in the nonagricultural sector 
alone. Overall, however, increased produc-
tivity in agriculture and nonagriculture to-
gether offers the greatest prospects for gen-
erating broad economic development and 
decreasing poverty. 
  Although much of the early development 
theory did not examine variations in growth 
and poverty-reduction potential within the 
agricultural sector, these differences were 
evident in the case studies. Growth in tradi-
tional and nontraditional, high-value exports 
can significantly contribute to farmers’ in-
comes in areas with good irrigation and 
convenient access to market centers. Yet, 
in all five countries, growth in food staples 
consistently offered greater poverty reduc-
tion than any of the other subsectors did. 
For most African countries, especially those 
with large populations, agricultural and 
broader economic growth will depend on 
growth in domestic markets. In this regard 
there is evidence that domestic demand for 
staple foods, which provide the bulk of that 
market, will double over the next 15 years 
(Diao and Hazell 2004). Increases in farm 
incomes obtained by taking advantage of 
this market opportunity will be greater than 
those offered by niche markets. 
Policy Implications
Many of the arguments for promoting agri-
cultural development are based on evidence 
showing this is an efficient strategy for 
economic growth, especially in countries at 
early stages of development. Small farms 
are also considered more efficient than large 
farms in countries with a surplus of labor 
but a scarcity of land and capital, whereas 
labor is often more costly in more developed 
economies.
  Where agriculture and small farms are 
most efficient, their development can be a 
“win–win” solution for increasing growth 
and reducing poverty. In such situations, 
an obvious policy implication is for govern-
ments to stand back and let market forces 
hold sway in driving agriculture and small 
farm development. In theory, this policy 
should ensure that the most efficient types of 
agriculture, commodities, regions, and farm 
sizes prevail. The primary role of policy in-
terventions should be to provide an enabling 
economic environment for market-led devel-
opment, which typically involves providing 
stable and undistorted economic incentives 
and essential public goods and services. 
  Although widely favored in much con-
temporary development thinking, this “hands-
off” approach ignores the presence of in-
stitutional and market failures that affect 
disparate groups and regions differently, pre-
venting the most efficient market outcomes 
from being realized. For example, if market 
failures favor large farms over small in ac-
cessing markets and inputs, then unfettered 
markets may generate outcomes dominated 
by large farms that are less efficient and less 
equitable than alternatives. Similar issues 
arise when market and institutional failures 
favor manufacturing over agriculture in 
countries that have a primary comparative 
advantage in agriculture. As such, targeted 
policy interventions that correct these un-
derlying market failures might increase ef-
ficiency and equity, leading to “win–win” 
outcomes. 
  Another reason for targeted policy inter-
ventions in the agricultural sector arises when 
growth must be balanced against poverty or 
other social goals. There is less debate about 
socially-oriented public investment since mar-
ket solutions to provide efficient outcomes 
are not necessarily equitable or poverty re-
ducing outcomes. However, growth-oriented 
investment in agriculture and rural economy 
can become a more effective alternative 
in poverty reduction than such subsistence-
oriented direct support. For example, food 
aid, a common response to distress from 
donors, typically costs more than US$250 
for each ton of cereals delivered in rural 
areas, compared to typical smallholder pro-
duction costs of US$100 or less (Sukume 
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be the case and the efficiency of public in-
vestment in agriculture is also constrained 
by many other conditions. Moreover, one 
also needs to be concerned that public in-
vestment or support policies for nonviable 
small farms do not encourage too many 
workers and poor people to stay in agricul-
ture or for too long. In these cases, invest-
ment in agriculture and small farms may 
compete with investing in scarce resources 
in other sectors that may be more efficient 
in stimulating the economic transformation, 
such as investment in human capital and in 
institutional and social capital. 
  It is also important to consider that pub-
lic interventions are not without cost, nor do 
governments necessarily have the capacity 
to intervene effectively in the ways they de-
sire. A key question for any intervention is 
whether the net economic and social bene-
fits of intervening are sufficient to justify 
the costs. This is a particularly important 
question for small farm development strate-
gies that require investment in public infra-
structure and services over large rural spaces, 
and effective but spatially dispersed rural in-
stitutions. This strategy might be much more 
costly and challenging than some urban-
based development strategies and must be 
justified on the basis of significant win–win 
benefits. 
  Context is also very important when 
thinking about appropriate interventions to 
assist farmers. Countries with dynamic and 
growing national economies and rising per 
capita incomes offer farmers many more 
opportunities to diversify into higher value 
products or nonfarm sources of income or to 
exit farming. But in poorer and slower grow-
ing economies, opportunities for income 
diversification and exit strategies are much 
more limited. Assisting farmers in countries 
or regions with limited agricultural poten-
tial is also likely to be more costly and less 
effective than in areas with good potential, 
and may need to be undertaken as part of 
a managed exit strategy for many farmers. 
Clearly, a one-size-fits-all approach will not 
work across all situations.
  African agricultural development in-
volves a number of key policies. First, prod-
uct and input markets need to provide effi-
cient outcomes. Because it is unrealistic to 
expect that the private sector alone can, in 
the short-term, offer the necessary levels 
of marketing and input services, there is a 
need for greater public sector involvement 
in many African countries than is currently 
fashionable. The challenge is to develop 
new institutional arrangements between the 
public and private sectors that can foster 
private sector development and investment 
without leaving farmers in the lurch during 
the transition. Interventions in land tenure 
systems to provide smallholders with more 
equitable and secure access to land as well 
as the development of flexible land markets 
are part of institutional innovation. Second, 
because small farmers face an increasingly 
tilted playing field, their ability to attain a 
viable future depends on improving infra-
structure and education, distributing key 
technologies and inputs, and promoting pro-
ducer marketing organizations that can link 
small farmers to the new market chains. 
Small farmers cannot do all these things on 
their own, and the public, private, and non-
governmental organization sectors all have 
important roles to play. Third, synergies with 
the nonfarm sector should be fostered. In-
vesting in the human and financial assets of 
the rural poor are important for enhancing 
the latter’s access to productive nonfarm em-
ployment and thereby help them find viable 
exit strategies from agriculture as their econ-
omies grow. Finally, safety nets should be 
established for those households unable to 
adapt, or who slip into poverty as a result of 
risks that they cannot manage. Indeed, al-
though agricultural growth can make deep 
inroads into poverty and hunger in many 
poor countries, vulnerability to production 
and market shocks will still persist. Vul-
nerability is particularly severe for rural 
households during times of crisis and when 
confronted with chronic diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS. By involving local communities 
in the design and delivering of assistance, CONCLUSIONS   41
there have been real advances in recent 
years in targeting assistance in an efficient 
manner that corresponds to local needs and 
constraints. 
  There is both cause and evidence to 
counter pessimistic views about the future of 
smallholder agriculture in Africa. As high-
lighted by Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade 
(2004), African agriculture has enjoyed 
notable successes in advancing research and 
development, improving environmental con-
servation techniques, and seizing new mar-
k e t  o p p o rt u n i t i e s .  M o r e o v e r ,  m a n y  o f  t h e  
public investments and policies needed to 
encourage agricultural development are also 
essential for stimulating growth in sectors 
outside of agriculture. Therefore, although 
many new challenges face African agri-
culture today, the continent has the capacity 
to tackle them, thereby releasing millions of 
people from poverty. 42
Appendix: Mathematical Specifications 
of the Models
T
wo different types of models are used in this study: economywide multimarket (EMM) 
models (Ethiopia, Ghana, and Rwanda) and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
(Uganda and Zambia). However, the models of the five case study countries differ ac-
cording to both their specification and the disaggregation of the data used to calibrate them. 
This first section of the appendix identifies the different sectors and commodities used in the 
models, while subsequent sections review the general specifications of the EMM and the CGE 
models. Sectoral and institutional structures of both models are summarized in Table A3.
Mathematical Specification of the EMM Models
Supply Functions












R,Z,i,t is the yield for crop i with technology q in region R and district (or zone in the 
case of Ethiopia) Z at time t, and P R,Z,i is the producer price for i and can be different across 
regions or zones. Yq
R,Z,i,t is the productivity shift parameter, which varies according to different 
technologies q. YAq
R,Z,i,t could be estimated as a function of modern inputs, such as irrigation, 
fertilizer, and improved seed, were more data available. Currently, only the Ethiopian model 
captures the mean difference across technologies, while there is no such information on tech-
nology difference in the models for the other countries. In the case of the Ethiopian model, 
there are a total of 15 different technologies for the major (mainly cereal) crops, which implies 
that there are 15 yield functions per crop per zone; maize, for example, is characterized by the 
different level of YAq
R,Z,i,t, which changes over time:
YAq
R,Z,i,t+1 = YAq
R,Z,i,t(1 + gYR,Z,i), (2)
where gYR,Z,i is the annual productivity growth rate.












βR,Z,j = 0,  (3)
where Aq
R,Z,i,t is the area for crop i with technology q and P 1, P 2, . . . P J are the producer prices 
for all commodities; AAq
R,Z,i,t is the shift parameter, which captures the area expansion:MATHEMATICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODELS      43
Table A1  The structure of poverty and production in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1999
  Share of population or GDP (%)
 Number  GDP  p.c.  Poverty  Total  Poor  Rural  Agriculture  Industry
Region  of countries  (1995 US$)  headcount  population  population  population  to GDP  to GDP
Sub-Saharan Africa  42  865  50.7  100.0  100.0  63.5  29.3  28.0
Middle-income countries  8  2,996  26.4  7.8  0.8  49.8  8.4  42.6
 Botswana      4,130  22.0  0.3  0.1  50.6  2.4  46.7
 Cape  Verde      1,550  27.3  0.1  0.0  36.7  11.0  16.8
 Equatorial  Guinea      1,578  31.7  0.1  0.0  50.8  8.5  87.0
 Gabon      4,378  23.0  0.2  0.1  17.8  7.6  50.6
 Namibia      2,383  33.9  0.3  0.2  68.6  11.3  32.7
 Mauritius      4,352  5.0  0.2  0.0  58.4  6.3  31.2
 South  Africa      4,068  2.0  6.6  0.2  42.4  3.2  31.2
 Swaziland      1,529  66.0  0.2  0.2  73.3  16.8  44.4
Low-income countries  34  363  56.4  92.2  99.2  66.7  34.2  24.5
More favored agriculture  26  386  55.2  82.3  88.6  64.8  33.2  26.3
 Coastal  countries  10  383  40.8  21.7  15.1  63.0  33.5  19.6
  Benin      424  16.4  1.0  0.3  57.0  35.5  14.4
  Côte  d’Ivoire      715  13.5  2.5  0.6  56.0  24.3  21.6
  The  Gambia      382  37.8  0.2  0.1  68.7  39.6  14.2
  Ghana      421  44.8  3.0  2.3  63.6  35.9  25.2
  Guinea-Bissau      206  84.2  0.2  0.3  67.7  56.2  12.7
  Kenya      325  23.9  4.7  1.9  65.7  19.0  18.2
  Mozambique      213  32.6  2.8  1.5  66.8  22.0  25.8
  Senegal      629  13.3  1.5  0.3  51.9  17.9  26.9
  Tanzania      197  78.3  5.2  7.0  66.8  44.8  15.8
  Togo      322  63.3  0.7  0.8  66.1  39.4  21.1
 Landlocked  countries  6  335  54.6  19.1  22.0  78.8  32.5  22.8
  Burkina  Faso      250  57.0  1.8  1.7  83.1  38.2  20.7
  Ethiopia      121  85.2  10.0  14.6  84.1  52.3  11.1
  Lesotho      563  40.9  0.3  0.2  71.3  16.3  42.0
  Malawi      163  51.0  1.6  1.4  84.9  34.0  17.9
  Uganda      355  40.8  3.5  2.4  85.5  36.4  20.9
  Zimbabwe      559  52.4  2.0  1.7  64.0  17.6  24.4
 Mineral-rich  countries  10  420  70.1  41.4  51.5  58.1  33.3  35.0
  Angola      525  72.2  2.1  2.5  65.2  8.0  66.8
    Central  African        696  40.0  2.3  1.6  50.3  42.7  19.6
 Republic
  Cameroon      339  81.5  0.6  0.8  58.3  55.4  20.9
    Democratic  Republic        85  92.4  7.9  12.5  60.0  56.3  18.8
 of  Congo 
  Republic  of  Congo      792  52.0  0.5  0.4  34.0  5.9  66.1
  Guinea      613  64.0  1.2  1.3  72.0  24.4  37.7
  Nigeria      257  67.6  19.8  22.8  55.1  29.5  46.0
  Sierra  Leone      158  71.8  0.8  1.0  62.7  50.1  29.8
  Sudan      328  80.0  4.8  6.6  63.0  38.9  18.8
  Zambia      405  79.3  1.6  2.1  60.2  22.1  25.6
Less favored agriculture  8  289  60.1  9.9  10.6  73.2  37.4  18.9
 Comoros      433  55.5  0.1  0.1  66.2  40.9  11.1
 Madagascar      253  45.9  2.4  1.9  69.9  29.8  14.5
 Burundi      141  65.4  1.1  1.2  90.7  50.0  18.7
 Mali      292  71.7  1.7  2.1  69.1  37.8  26.4
 Rwanda      253  58.9  1.3  1.3  93.7  40.5  21.6
 Chad      230  81.8  1.2  1.7  75.8  38.6  13.7
 Mauritania      502  27.2  0.4  0.2  41.0  20.9  28.6
 Niger      208  74.5  1.7  2.2  78.9  40.4  16.9
Source: Authors’ calculations using World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003a) and UNIDO (2004) for 1999 dollar-a-day poverty rates.
Notes:  Simple averages were used thus treating all countries equally regardless of population. Five Sub-Saharan countries are excluded 
because of data limitations (Eritrea, Mayotte, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, and Somalia). p.c. is per capita.44   APPENDIX
Table A2  Growth decomposition for African countries, 1985–1999
     Growth 
  Share of GDP (1999)  GDP growth rate (%)  contribution (%)
Region  Agric. Ind. Serv. Agric. Ind. Serv. Agric. Ind. Serv. GDP  growth
Sub-Saharan Africa  29.3  28.0  42.8  3.2  4.0  3.1  1.0  1.0  1.3  3.4
Middle-income countries  8.4  42.6  49.0  2.7  8.4  5.7  0.4  3.1  2.8  6.3
 Botswana  2.4  46.7  50.9  2.6  5.3  13.5  0.1  2.8  5.9  8.8
 Cape  Verde  11.0  16.8  72.2  3.8  5.0  5.0  0.5  1.0  3.3  4.8
 Equatorial  Guinea  8.5  87.0  4.6  4.3  33.0  8.5  1.9  11.7  1.7  15.4
 Gabon  7.6  50.6  41.7  0.0  2.5  2.3  0.0  1.2  1.0  2.2
 Namibia  11.3  32.7  55.9  4.7  2.2  3.7  0.5  0.7  2.1  3.3
 Mauritius  6.3  31.2  62.5  1.4  7.7  6.2  0.2  2.5  3.5  6.1
 South  Africa  3.2  31.2  65.6  3.3  0.6  2.2  0.1  0.2  1.3  1.7
 Swaziland  16.8  44.4  38.8  1.8  10.7  4.1  0.3  4.4  1.8  6.4
Low-income countries  34.2  24.5  41.3  3.3  3.0  2.5  1.1  0.7  1.1  2.9
More favored agriculture  33.2  26.3  40.5  3.2  3.1  2.4  1.1  0.8  1.0  2.9
 Coastal  countries  33.5  19.6  46.9  3.5  4.1  3.3  1.2  0.7  1.5  3.5
  Benin  35.5  14.4  50.0  5.4  3.7  2.9  1.9  0.5  1.5  3.9
  Côte  d’Ivoire  24.3  21.6  54.1  2.9  4.1  1.1  0.8  0.9  0.6  2.3
  The  Gambia  39.6  14.2  46.2  3.0  5.4  3.2  0.9  0.7  1.8  3.4
  Ghana  35.9  25.2  38.9  2.7  5.0  6.5  1.1  1.1  2.4  4.6
  Guinea-Bissau  56.2  12.7  31.1  3.6  0.8  3.1  2.0  0.1  1.0  3.1
  Kenya  19.0  18.2  62.9  2.0  2.8  3.8  0.6  0.5  2.0  3.1
  Mozambique  22.0  25.8  52.2  4.6  7.9  6.2  1.7  1.6  2.7  6.0
  Senegal  17.9  26.9  55.2  3.3  4.7  3.3  0.6  1.0  2.0  3.6
  Tanzania  44.8  15.8  39.4  3.5  2.8  2.9  1.6  0.4  1.1  3.1
  Togo  39.4  21.1  39.4  3.7  3.6  0.4  1.3  0.8  0.2  2.3
 Landlocked  countries  32.5  22.8  44.7  3.6  4.5  4.3  1.3  1.0  1.8  4.1
  Burkina  Faso  38.2  20.7  41.1  4.2  4.0  4.7  1.5  0.9  2.0  4.3
  Ethiopia  52.3  11.1  36.5  2.7  1.8  4.9  1.5  0.2  1.7  3.4
  Lesotho  16.3  42.0  41.7  2.1  8.3  4.3  0.4  2.6  2.1  5.1
  Malawi  34.0  17.9  48.1  5.5  3.0  2.9  2.2  0.7  1.1  4.0
  Uganda  36.4  20.9  42.8  3.5  9.0  6.1  1.7  1.3  2.2  5.2
  Zimbabwe  17.6  24.4  57.9  3.4  1.1  2.7  0.6  0.3  1.4  2.3
 Mineral-rich  countries  33.3  35.0  31.7  2.8  1.3  0.4  0.8  0.4  0.2  1.4
  Angola  8.0  66.8  25.3  1.3  3.9  –0.4  0.2  2.1  –0.1  2.1
  Central  African  Republic  55.4  20.9  23.7  2.8  1.2  –0.9  1.4  0.2  –0.3  1.3
  Cameroon  42.7  19.6  37.7  3.7  –0.1  –0.5  1.2  0.0  –0.2  1.0
    Democratic Republic of Congo  56.3  18.8  24.9  1.1  –6.1  –7.0  0.5  –1.4  –2.4  –3.3
  Republic  of  Congo  5.9  66.1  28.0  2.2  2.0  0.0  0.2  0.9  0.0  1.2
  Guinea  24.4  37.7  37.9  4.1  3.6  3.2  1.0  1.2  1.4  3.5
  Nigeria  29.5  46.0  24.5  4.7  2.5  4.9  1.5  1.0  1.2  3.8
  Sierra  Leone  50.1  29.8  20.1  –3.5  –0.1  –1.2  –1.5  0.0  –0.4  –2.0
  Sudan  38.9  18.8  42.4  6.6  6.0  4.1  2.6  1.0  1.8  5.4
  Zambia  22.1  25.6  52.3  4.5  –0.3  2.2  0.9  –0.1  0.9  1.7
Less favored agriculture  37.4  18.9  43.7  3.5  2.7  2.6  1.3  0.5  1.2  3.0
 Comoros  40.9  11.1  48.0  3.4  3.7  –1.0  1.3  0.4  –0.5  1.2
 Madagascar  29.8  14.5  55.7  2.2  2.6  2.5  0.7  0.3  1.4  2.4
 Burundi  50.0  18.7  31.3  1.4  0.8  1.8  0.8  0.2  0.5  1.4
 Mali  37.8  26.4  35.9  4.1  6.8  2.1  1.8  1.2  0.8  3.8
 Rwanda  40.5  21.6  37.9  3.2  1.8  3.7  1.3  0.3  1.5  3.1
 Chad  38.6  13.7  47.7  5.8  3.3  3.8  2.1  0.5  1.9  4.4
 Mauritania  20.9  28.6  50.5  3.9  2.6  4.5  1.0  0.8  1.9  3.8
 Niger  40.4  16.9  42.7  3.7  0.3  3.6  1.4  0.0  1.6  3.1
Source: Authors’ calculations using World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003a).
Notes:  Aggregations across countries are simple-averages rather than GDP weighted averages. Although average GDP shares for 1985–2001 
were used for decomposition, only the share for 2001 is shown, for consistency with other tables. Agric. is agriculture; Ind. is industry; 
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Table A3  Sectors, households, and regions in the models
Ethiopia   Economywide Multimarket Model
 Agriculture 
    Staple crops    Maize; teff; wheat; sorghum; barley; millet; oats; rice; potatoes; beans; peas; other 
    pulses; groundnuts; rapeseed; sesame; other oil crops; domestic vegetables; bananas; 
other domestic fruits
    Export crops    Exportable vegetables; other horticultural crops; chat; cotton; coffee; sugar; beverages 
 and  spices
    Other  Bovine meat; goat meat and mutton; other meat; dairy products; poultry; fish
 Nonagriculture 
  Industry  Industry
  Services    Services
  Regions  56 nationally defined zones
  Households  112 aggregate households representing rural and urban in 56 zones
  Data sources    Agricultural Sample Survey, 1997/98–2000/01 (Central Statistics Authority)
  Agricultural Sample Enumeration, 2001/02 (Central Statistics Authority)
  Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey, 1999/2000 (HICES) 
  Ethiopia Statistical Abstract, 2003 (Central Statistics Authority)
  Statistical Database, 2004 (Ethiopian Economic Association)
  FAOSTAT (for agriculture) and World Bank (for sector GDP)
Ghana  Economywide Multimarket Model
 Agriculture 
    Staple crops    Maize; rice; wheat; sorghum and millet; cassava; yam; cocoyam; plantains; groundnut; 
 beans
    Export crops    Cotton; nuts; exportable vegetables; pineapple; coconut; other exportable fruits; sugar; 
  cocoa bean; coffee; oil palm; tobacco; rubber; wood
    Other    Domestically consumed vegetables; domestically consumed fruits; beef; poultry; mutton 
  meat; pig meat; other meat; fish; eggs; milk 
 Nonagriculture 
    Industry    Cocoa processing; fish processing; other food processing; mines; other manufacturing;
  electricity and water; construction
    Services  Transportation services; trade; finance; government; community services
  Regions  10 nationally defined regions
  Households  20 aggregate households representing rural and urban in 10 regions
  Data sources    Ghana Living Standards Survey 4, 1998/99 (GLSS4) (Ghana Statistical Service)
  Agriculture in Ghana, Facts and Figures (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2003)
  FAOSTAT (for agriculture) and World Bank and IMF (for sector GDP and trade)
Rwanda  Economywide multimarket model
 Agriculture 
    Staple crops    Maize; rice; wheat; sorghum; cassava; potatoes; sweet potatoes; other root crops; beans;
 peas;  bananas
  Export  crops  Coffee;  tea
    Other    Peanuts; soybeans; vegetable oil; vegetables; fruits; sugar; beverages; beef; mutton; 
  poultry; other meat; fish; eggs; milk
 Nonagriculture 
  Industry  Home  processing;  industry
  Services  Services
  Regions  11 nationally defined provinces plus 1 capital city
  Households    48 aggregate households representing rural and urban in 12 regions by gender of house-
 hold  heads
  Data sources  Household Living Condition Survey, 1999–2001 (EICV) 
    Agricultural Statistics, 1998–2002 (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and 
 Forestry)
    FAOSTAT (for agriculture) and World Bank and IMF (for sector GDP and trade)
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AAq
R,Z,i,t+1 = AAq
R,Z,i,t(1 + gAR,Z,i), (4)
where  gAR,Z,i is the ann ual area e xpansi on 
rate for crop i with technology q. Given 
that most prices are endogenous in the 
model, area functions (similar to the supply 
functions for noncrop production) capture 
cross-sector linkages among crops, be-
tween crop and noncrop agriculture (such 
as livestock), and between agriculture and 
nonagriculture. 




































Z,i,t(1 + gSR,Z,i), (7)
where gSR,Z,i is the annual growth rate of 
livestock and nonagricultural productivity 
and varies by region or district and com-
modity, and gY, gA, and gS from equations 2, 
4, and 7, respectively, are exogenous vari-
ables in the model.
Table A3—Continued
Uganda  Computable general equilibrium model
 Agriculture 
    Staple crops  Maize; sorghum; cassava; sweet potato; mattock; horticulture; other agricultural crops
    Export crops  Coffee; cash crops
  Other  Livestock;  forestry;  fishing
 Nonagriculture 
    Industry    Meat; coffee processing; milling; beverages and tobacco; textiles; other manufacturing; 
  fertilizer; petroleum; energy; construction
    Services  Trade services; transport services; private services; public services
  Regions  6 IFPRI-defined development domains (see Pender et al. 2001)
  Households    9 representative households: urban (poor and nonpoor households); and rural (across the
  6 agroecological zones and 1 nonfarm household).
  Data sources  Uganda National Household Survey, 1999 (UBOS)
  IFPRI Uganda Social Accounting Matrix, 1999
  World Bank (for sector GDP, population and labor force trends)
  FAOSTAT (for trends in agricultural yields)
Zambia  Computable general equilibrium model
 Agriculture 
    Staple crops  Maize; millet and sorghum; groundnuts; wheat; horticulture; other crops
    Export crops  Sugar; cotton; tobacco; coffee
  O t h e r   L i v e s t o c k ;   f i s h e r i e s ;   f o r e s t r y
 Nonagriculture 
    Industry    Mining; food, beverages, and tobacco; textiles and garments; wood and paper; fertilizer 
  and chemicals; other manufacturing; electricity and water; capital goods; construction
    Services    Trade and transport; hotel and catering; community services; financial services; public 
 services
  Regions  9 nationally defined provinces 
  Households    73 representative households: by 9 provinces; rural (small, medium, large, and 
  nonfarm households); and urban (low, medium, and high cost-of-living areas)
  Data sources  Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 1998 (Central Statistical Office)
  IFPRI Zambia Social Accounting Matrix, 2001
  IMF (for population and labor force trends) and World Bank (for GDP trends)
  FAOSTAT (for trends in agricultural yields)MATHEMATICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODELS      47
  With regional disaggregation and com-
modity details, it is infeasible to estimate 
the supply elasticities used in the model. 
Thus, a modest own-price elasticity of 0.2 is 
chosen for the supply function.16 The nega-
tive cross-price elasticities in the function 
are then derived from the own-price elas-
ticity multiplied by the value share of each 
commodity (at the district level). The homo-
geneity of degree zero condition is imposed 
on the supply function such that, within 
each time period, there is no area alloca-
tion response if all prices change propor-
tionally. The other constraint on crop area 
function is imposed to avoid a simultaneous 
expansion of all crop areas over a given time 
period.
Demand Functions
District level per capita demand is a func-













where  DpcR,Z,i i s  p e r  c a p i t a  d e m a n d  f o r  
commodity i in region R and district Z, and 
PCR,Z,j is the consumer price for j in region 
R and district Z; j = 1,2, . . .,J (including two 
aggregate nonagricultural goods); GDPpcR,Z 
is per capita income for region R and district 
Z’s rural or urban consumers. εR,Z,i,j is price 
elasticity between demand for commodity i 
and price for commodity j, and εI
R,Z,i is in-










R,Z,i = 1,  (9)
where shR,Z,i is the expenditure share of com-
modity i. Income elasticity is estimated using 
Household Income, Consumption, and Ex-
penditure Survey (HICES; CSA 2001) data 
for the rural and urban. Owing to the con-
straint of sample size, estimation at the sub-
national level is not significant, and hence 
we assume similar income elasticity for all 
the rural households and a similar one for 
all the urban households. The price elas-
ticities are calculated from the above two 
constraint equations, with an assumption on 
the subsistence consumption level for each 
commodity in a linear expenditure demand 
system.
Relationship between Producer 
and Consumer Prices
It is assumed that import and export parity 
prices are the border prices adjusted by 
trade margins. In the case of the Ethiopian 
model, national market prices are represented 
by the prices in Addis Ababa, while prices 
at the zonal level are linked to, but differ-
ent from, national market prices. Prices are 
higher in the food deficit area and lower 
in the food surplus area compared with na-
tional market prices. The farther the zone 
from the nearest major market centers, the 
lower the prices. The difference between 
district-level prices and those at national 
markets is defined as regional market mar-
gins. Specifically, for imported commodities, 
the following relationship exists between 
import parity prices and consumer prices in 
national markets:
PCi,t ≤ (1 + Wmi)⋅PWMi, (10)
where Wmi is the trade margin between bor-
der prices PWMi and consumer prices PCi 
in national markets when commodity i is 
importable. The relationship between district 
level and national market prices (for con-
sumer prices) is:
PCR,Z,i,t = (1 + DgapR,Z,i)⋅PCi,t, (11)
16Using an aggregate, normalized quadratic profit function (at mean values of prices and fixed factors) Abrar, 
Morrissey, and Rayner (2004) estimate the own-price elasticity of output to be around 0.013 in dual and 0.08 
in primal, which are significant. As an aggregate profit function is considered, the substitution possibility is 
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where DgapR,Z,i is negative if Z is in the 
food surplus area and positive if Z is in 
the food deficit area.
  National market prices and export parity 
prices for exportable commodities have the 
following relationship:
P i,t ≥ (1 – Wmi)⋅PWEi, (12)
where P is the producer price and PWE the 
border price; the equation holds only when 
commodity i is exportable. Consumer and 
producer prices are not necessary the same, 
such that:
PCR,Z,i,t = (1 + DmR,Z,i)⋅P R,Z,i,t,   (13)
where  Dm is the margin between con-
sumer and producer prices. The following 
relationship exists between domestic market 
import/export parity prices for nontradable 
commodities:
(1 – Wmi)⋅PWEi ≤ Pi,t ≤ PCi,t 
≤ (1 + Wmi)⋅PWMi. 
(14)
Exports and Imports
Trade (either in imports or exports) is deter-
mined by the difference between national 
market prices and import/export parity 
prices, that is, where
P i,t = (1 – Wmi)⋅PWEi, Ei,t > 0;  (15)
otherwise, Ei,t = 0. Ei is exports of commod-
ity i; and if 
PCi,t =   (1 + Wmi)
⋅PWMi, Mi,t  >   0 ;         ( 1 6 )
otherwise, Mi,t = 0. Mi is imports of com-
modity i.
 Notice  that  Ei and Mi can be zero in the 
early stages in the model; hence, the prices 
for nontraded goods are endogenously de-
termined. If the domestic consumer prices 
PCi rise over time (but not the border prices) 
owing to increased demand exceeding the 
increased supply, PCi starts to approach (1 + 
Wmi)PWMi. Once PCi = (1 + Wmi)PWMi, 
imports occur for commodity i, and PC is 
linked to PWM, which is exogenous. A sim-
ilar but opposite situation holds for Pi; that 
is, if P falls over time such that Pi = (1 + 
Wmi)PWEi, exports occur and P is linked 
to PWE.
Regional Crop Deficit and Surplus
The model can identify which districts are 
food deficit or food surplus, but it cannot 
identify trade flows among zones. That is, 
total deficits and surpluses are cleared (bal-
anced) in the national market and no re-
gional differential market exists. Crop i is 
in deficit (surplus) if the following equation 
is positive (negative):
DEFR,Z,i,t   = DpcR,Z,i,t⋅PoP R,Z,t 
– SR,Z,i,t,        ( 1 7 )
where PoP is population in region R, district 
Z, at time t.









This equation solves for the price of com-
modity i if both M and E are zero. Other-
wise, it solves for the value of M or E. 
GDP and Per Capita 
Income Function
Income in the model is endogenous and 
determined by production revenues. Given 
that the model does not explicitly include 
input and, hence, the costs of input, the 
prices for agricultural commodities are ad-
justed such that the sector production reve-
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Income per capita is:
  GDP R,Z,t GDPpcR,Z,t = ———–.  (20)   PoP R,Z,t
Poverty Population and 
Poverty Rate
Let PoorIncrur be the (per capita) poverty 
line expenditure for rural areas and GDP R,
rur
Z,t 
be total rural income in region R and district 
Z at time t; let ShR,
rur
Z,h be income share for 
rural household group h in region R and 
zone Z; the rural population of household 
group h, PopR,
rur
Z,h,t, equals the sample weights 
multiplied by the household size, repre-
sented by the sample household for group h 
updated with the population growth rate. 



































Z,h,t < PoorIncrur population 
PopR,
rur
Z,h,t is in the poor.   (23)
  Two factors affect IR,
rur








is directly solved from the EMM model. 
Changes in DpcR,
rur
Z,h,i,t are assumed to be 
proportional to the same commodity con-
sumed by the representative rural household 
in the same district. For example, in the case 
of the Ethiopian model, if consumption of 
teff increases by 1.3 percent at t = 2006 for 
the rural household in zone of West Tigray 
owing to an increase in GDPR,
rur
Z,t for R = 
Tigray, Z = West Tigray, and t = 2006, then 
there is a 1.3 percent increase in the spend-
ing on teff in all 143 sample households 
in the rural West Tigray represented in the 
micro simulation model, that is, an increase 
in DpcR,
rur
Z,h,i,t for R = Tigray, Z = West Ti-
gray, h = households represented by the rural 
West Tigray, i = teff, and t = 2006. However, 
the share of teff in each of the 143 house-
holds’ total expenditure varies. Therefore, 
the 1.3 percent increase in teff expenditure 
will affect each of the 143 households differ-
ently, depending on the budget share of teff 
in their consumption basket; that is, IR,
rur
Z,h,t 
varies by household in the simulations. The 
effect on total household expenditure IR,
rur
Z,h,t 
will be larger for a household that spends 
more of its income on teff than for those that 
spend less income on teff. These differential 
effects occur for all commodities included 
in the EMM model. With such changes, a 
household whose total expenditure IpcR,
rur
Z,h,0 
is less than PoorIncrur initially can move 
out of poverty, if the total expenditure of its 
family members, IpcR,
rur
Z,h,0, is greater than 
PoorIncrur at t = 2006.
  The new poverty population in the rural 
area is the sum of PopR,
rur
Z,h,t over h for all h 
with IpcR,
rur
Z,h,t < PoorIncrur. The poverty rate 
is calculated by the ratio of this number over 
the total rural population. The urban pov-
erty population and poverty rate can be de-
fined using a similar method. As poverty 
population is defined at the household group 
level, the poverty rate can easily be calcu-
lated at a specific subnational level, such as 
for the food deficit area or for the country as 
a whole.
Mathematical Specification 
of the CGE Models
A recursive dynamic CGE model can be 
separated into within-period and between-
period components. The former describes a 
static single-period model in which con-
sumers and producers behave myopically 
(that is, without factoring future expecta-
tions into their current decisionmaking). The 
dynamics of the model involve updating the 
parameters of the subsequent period to re-
flect either changes that have taken place 
in the current period, such as investment 50   APPENDIX
spending, or exogenous changes in the 
economic environment, such as population 
growth. The mathematical specification of 
the core static model is presented first, fol-
lowed by the dynamics of the model. All 
variables and equations are shown in Tables 
A4 and A5 near the end of this section of 
the appendix. The mathematical equations 
forming the static model are grouped into 
sections. Initially the production and price 
structure of the model is described, which 
includes the determination of import and 
e x p o rt  d e m an d  [ eq u a ti o n s  ( 24 )  t o  ( 5 0)  in 
Table A5]. Having generated incomes for 
the factors of production, the description 
shifts to determining the level of institu-
tional incomes and consumption, as well as 
the remaining components of demand [equa-
tions (51) to (60)]. The third section of 
equations describes the equilibrium condi-
tions imposed on the model [equations (61) 
to (66)]. The remaining equations (67 to 72) 
govern the accumulation of capital, which is 
the endogenous component of the dynamic 
model. 
  Production is characterized by a two-
level nesting structure and involves the com-
bining of factors and intermediate inputs. 
Aggregate intermediate quantity and price 
are determined by a Leontief or fixed share 
aggregation of individual intermediate com-
modities. This is shown in equations (24) 
and (25), in which the aggregate quantity of 
intermediates for an activity QINTAa is 
comprised of the fixed shares of the indi-
vidual intermediate commodities used in that 
activity’s production QINTca. The use of 
fixed coefficients icaca (as opposed to al-
lowing substitution between intermediates) 
follows from the assumption that the inter-
mediate demands of a particular activity are 
predetermined by technology. Since inter-
mediate commodities are purchased in the 
market, the aggregate price of the interme-
diate inputs PINTAa for an activity is equal 
to the market price of each intermediate 
commodity PQc multiplied by its share icaca 
in total intermediate use. With the exception 
of nontraded goods, each intermediate com-
modity comes from domestic and foreign 
sources and is therefore treated as a compos-
ite input. Firms are able to substitute between 
domestic and foreign intermediate inputs 
through the constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function given by equation (44). 
  Unlike the Leontief treatment of inter-
mediates, factors are combined into a com-
posite primary factor under a CES function 
[equations (26) and (27)], which combines 
the factor demands of an activity QF fa into 
an aggregate quantity of value-added inputs 
for that activity QVAa. This treatment al-
lows for substitution between factors when 
determining composite factor inputs. Inter-
factor substitutability increases when the 
value of ρa
va (which is a transformation of 
the elasticity of factor substitution) is re-
duced. An activity’s factor demand is driven 
by cost minimization based on the relative 
prices of factors, such that their marginal 
revenue product equals their marginal cost. 
The marginal cost of the composite factor at 
the top of the factor demand nest for each 
sector is equal to its marginal revenue prod-
uct, where marginal cost is the economy-
wide average wage Wf multiplied by a sector-
specific distortion term WFDIST fa. Total 
factor productivity (TFP) is reflected by αa
va 
and factor-specific productivity by αfa
vaf. 
  Demand for individual factors at lower 
levels of the nested demand system is given 
in equations (28) and (29), in which the 
latter is the first-order condition. In these 
equations f′ and f″ are the lower-level fac-
tors. Demand for an individual factor f′ in a 
given level of the nested structure is driven 
by cost minimization based on the relative 
prices of all factors f″ both at the same level 
and with substitution possibilities with f′. 
Substitution possibilities are determined by 
ρfa
van, which is a transformation of the elas-
ticity of factor substitution.
  The composite factor quantities and ag-
gregate intermediate quantities are combined 
under a Leontief specification [equations 
(30) and (31)] to arrive at a final level of 
output for each activity QAa. This produc-
tion function is strongly separable, since the MATHEMATICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODELS      51
Table A4  CGE model sets, parameters, and variables
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation
Sets    
a ∈ A Activities  c ∈ CEN(⊂ C)  Commodities not in CE
a ∈ ALEO(⊂ A)      Activities with a Leontief function at the top of   c ∈ CMN(⊂ C)  Commodities not in CM
  the technology nest  c ∈ CT(⊂ C)  Transaction service commodities
c ∈ C Commodities  c ∈ CX(⊂ C)  Commodities with domestic production 
c ∈ CD(⊂ C)      Commodities with domestic sales of domestic   f ∈ F Factors
 output  i ∈ INS  Institutions (domestic and rest of world)
c ∈ CDN(⊂ C)  Commodities not in CD  i ∈ INSD(⊂ INS) Domestic  institutions
c ∈ CE(⊂ C)  Exported commodities   i ∈ INSDNG(⊂ INSD)  Domestic nongovernment institutions
Parameters    
cwtsc  Weight of commodity c in the CPI  pwec  Export price (foreign currency)
dwtsc   Weight of commodity c in the producer price   pwmc  Import price (foreign currency)
 index  qdstc  Quantity of stock change 
icaca   Quantity  of  c as intermediate input per unit of   qgc  Base-year quantity of government demand
 activity  a qinvc  Base-year quantity of private investment
icdcc′    Quantity of commodity c as trade input per unit       demand
 of  c′ produced and sold domestically  shifif  Share for domestic institution i in income
icecc′   Quantity of commodity c as trade input per        of factor f
  exported unit of c′  shiiii′  Share of net income of i′ to i
icmcc′   Quantity of commodity c as trade input per      (i′ ∈ INSDNG′; i ∈ INSDNG)
  imported unit of c′  taa  Tax rate for activity a
intaa    Quantity of aggregate intermediate input per   tinsi  Exogenous direct tax rate for domestic 
 activity  unit     institution  i
ivaa    Quantity of aggregate intermediate input per   tins01i  0–1 parameter with 1 for institutions with 
  activity unit      potentially flexed direct tax rates
mpsi  Base savings rate for domestic institution i  tmc  Import tariff rate
mps01i    0–1 parameter with 1 for institutions with   tqc  Rate of sales tax
  potentially flexed direct tax rates  trnsfrif  Transfer from factor f to institution i
Greek Symbols   
αa
a  Efficiency parameter in the CES activity function  δc
t  CET function share parameter
αa
va    Efficiency parameter in the CES value-added   δfa
va  CES value-added function share 
 function     parameter  for  factor  f in activity a
αc
ac    Shift parameter for domestic commodity   γch
m  Subsistence consumption of marketed 
 aggregation  function     commodity  c for household h
αc
q  Armington function shift parameter  θac  Yield of output c per unit of activity a
αc
t  CET function shift parameter  ρa
a  CES production function exponent
βa  Capital sectoral mobility factor  ρa
va  CES value-added function exponent
βm
ch    Marginal share of consumption spending on   ρc
ac  Domestic commodity aggregation 
 marketed  commodity  c for household h     function  exponent
δa
a  CES activity function share parameter  ρc
q  Armington function exponent
δac
ac    Share parameter for domestic commodity   ρc
t  CET function exponent
 aggregation  function  ηa
fat  Sector share of new capital
δc
q  Armington function share parameter  υf  Capital depreciation rate   
Exogenous variables   
CPI  Consumer price index   MPSADJ  Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for base)
DTINS    Change in domestic institution tax share   QFSf  Quantity supplied of factor
  (= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  TINSADJ    Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
FSAV  Foreign savings (FCU)      exogenous variable)
GADJ  Government consumption adjustment factor  WFDISTfa  Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
IADJ Investment  adjustment  factor      activity  a 
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composite primary factor cannot be substi-
tuted for the aggregate intermediate; nor can 
intermediates of one sector be substituted 
for intermediates of another. This additive 
separability can be seen in equation (32), in 
which the aggregate price of one unit of 
output from each activity PAa is calculated 
as the weighted sum of factor and interme-
diate prices exclusive of producer taxes taa.
  Because each activity can produce more 
than a single commodity, equations (33) 
and (34) convert each activity’s output and 
price into a commodity output QXACac 
and price PXACac based on fixed shares θac. 
Conversely, since each commodity can be 
produced by more than one activity, it is 
necessary to combine these commodities 
from their various sources. Although it is 
assumed that an activity’s production of com-
modities is fixed by technology, it is as-
sumed that demanders of a commodity are 
relatively indifferent to which activity pro-
duced the final commodity. As such, the 
aggregation of commodities across activi-
ties is governed by imperfect substitution or 
a CES function. Equations (35) and (36) 
show the CES aggregation function and 
its first-order conditions. In these equations 
output from each activity QXACac is com-
bined across activities to form a composite 
Table A4—Continued
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation
Endogenous variables   
AWFft
a  Average capital rental rate in time period t  QHAach  Quantity of household home consumption
DMPS    Change in domestic institution savings rates       of commodity c from activity a for 
  (= 0 for base; exogenous variable)      household h 
DPI    Producer price index for domestically marketed   QINTAa  Quantity of aggregate intermediate input
 output  QINT ca  Quantity of commodity c as intermediate   
EG  Government expenditures      input to activity a
EHh   Consumption spending for household  QINVc    Quantity of investment demand for
EXR  Exchange rate (LCU per unit of FCU)      commodity 
GSAV  Government savings  QMc  Quantity of imports of commodity c
MPSi    Marginal propensity to save for domestic non-  QQc  Quantity of goods supplied to domestic 
  government institution (exogenous variable)      market (composite supply)
PAa  Activity price (unit gross revenue)  QTc    Quantity of commodity demanded as 
PDDc    Demand price for commodity produced and       trade input
 sold  domestically  QVAa  Quantity of (aggregate) value added
PDSc    Supply price for commodity produced and sold   QXc  Aggregated quantity of domestic output
 domestically     of  commodity
PEc  Export price (domestic currency)  QXACac  Quantity of output of commodity c from 
PINTAa  Aggregate intermediate input price for activity a    activity  a
PKft  Unit price of capital in time period t   RWFf  Real average factor price
PMc  Import price (domestic currency)  TABS  Total nominal absorption
PQc  Composite commodity price  TINSi  Direct tax rate for institution i 
PVAa    Value-added price (factor income per unit of       (i ∈ INSDNG)
   activity)  TRIIii′  Transfers from institution i′ to i (both in 
PXc  Aggregate producer price for commodity      the set INSDNG)
PXACac  Producer price of commodity c for activity a  WF f  Average price of factor
QAa  Quantity (level) of activity  YF f  Income of factor f
QDc  Quantity sold domestically of domestic output  YG  Government revenue
QEc  Quantity of exports  YIi  Income of domestic nongovernment 
QF fa  Quantity demanded of factor f from activity a    institution
QGc  Government consumption demand for   YIF if  Income to domestic institution i from 
   commodity     factor  f
QHch   Quantity consumed of commodity c by  Ka
fat   Quantity of new capital by activity a for 
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Table A5  CGE model equations
Production and price equations 
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QVAa = ivaa⋅QAa  (30)
QINTAa= intaa⋅QAa  (31)
PAa⋅(1 – taa)⋅QAa = PVAa⋅QVAa + PINTAa⋅QINTAa (32)
QXACac = θac⋅QAa  (33)
PAa = Σ
c∈C
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t — –1 —
  (39)
 QDc PDSc  δt
c
QXc = QDc + QEc   (40)
PXc⋅QXc = PDSc⋅QDc + PEc⋅QEc (41)
PDDc = PDSc +  Σ
c′∈CT
PQc′⋅icdc′c (42)














  QMc PDDc  δc
q
—— = (——–⋅——–)
1+ —1 — ρc
q –
  (45)
 QDc PMc  1 – δc
q
QQc = QDc + QMc  (46)
PQc⋅(1 – tqc)⋅QQc = PDDc⋅QDc + PMc⋅QMc (47)
QT c =  Σ
c′∈C′
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Table A5—Continued
Institutional incomes and domestic demand equations 
YF f = Σ
a∈A
WF f ⋅WFDISTfa⋅QF fa (51)
YIF if = shifif⋅[YF f – trnsfr rowf⋅EXR] (52)
YIi = Σ
f∈F
YIF if + 
i′∈INΣ
SDNG′
TRIIii′ + trnsfr igov⋅CPI + trnsfr irow⋅EXR (53)
TRIIii′ = shiiii′⋅(1 – MPSi′)⋅(1 – tinsi′)⋅YIi′ (54)
EHh = (1 – 
i∈INΣ
SDNG
shiiih)⋅(1 – MPSh)⋅(1 – tinsh)⋅YIh (55)
PQc⋅QHch = PQc⋅γ ch
m + βch
m⋅(EHh –  Σ
c′∈C
PQc′⋅γm
c′h)   (56)
QINV c = IADJ⋅qinvc  (57)












taa⋅PAa⋅QAa +  Σ
c∈CMNR
tmc⋅pwmc⋅QMc⋅EXR 




YF govf + trnsfr govrow⋅EXR (60)





QGch + QGc + QINV c + qdstc + QT c (61)
Σ
a∈A
QF fa = QFSf  (62)










trnsfrirow + FSAV (64)
i∈INΣ
SDNG
MPSi⋅(1 – tinsi)⋅YIi + GSAV + EXR⋅FSAV = Σ
c∈C
PQc⋅QINV c + Σ
c∈C
PQc⋅qdstc (65)
MPSi = mpsi⋅(1 + MPSADJ) (66)
Capital accumulation and allocation equations 
  QF fat AWFa
ft = Σ




  QF fat  WF fat⋅WFDISTfat ηa
fat = (————)⋅(βa⋅(———————– – 1) +1) (68)
  Σ
a′
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commodity output QXc. Similarly the com-
posite output’s price PXc is the aggregation of 
each activity’s commodity price PXACac.
  The output of each commodity is then 
distributed across domestic and foreign mar-
kets. Under the small-country assumption, the 
price of an exported commodity, shown in 
equation (37), is equal to the commodity’s 
world export price pwec multiplied by the 
exchange rate EXR. Furthermore, since the 
export price represents the amount received 
by producers per unit sold abroad, the trans-
action costs per unit of output are removed 
from this price. This is equal to the share of 
transaction costs per commodity unit icec 
times the market price at which these trans-
action commodities are sold PQc. 
  For commodities that are sold both do-
mestically and abroad, equations (38) and 
(39) represent the constant elasticity of trans-
formation (CET) function determining the 
quantity and price of exported and domesti-
cally sold commodities. These equations rep-
resent the ease with which producers are 
able to substitute production between the two 
markets. Domestic and foreign commodi-
ties become more homogeneous as the elas-
ticity of transformation increases toward 
infinity. This imperfect substitution reflects 
the view that a producer can shift small 
amounts of resources between production 
for the domestic and foreign markets with-
out any loss of productive efficiency. Larger 
shifts in production toward a different mar-
ket, however, will require the use of factors 
that are less efficient. Thus the CET is con-
cave and the final allocation of a given out-
put is determined by the relative domestic 
and export prices. 
  Some commodities are produced solely 
for the domestic or foreign market. Equation 
(40) allocates production QXc to one of these 
markets. In such cases either the quantity of 
goods supplied to the domestic market QDc 
or the quantity exported QEc is zero. In 
equation (41), the value of output PXc⋅QXc 
must be equal to either the value of exports 
PEc⋅QEc or the value of domestic sales 
PDSc⋅QDc, where PDSc is the domestic sup-
ply price. In equation (42) the domestic 
supply price of a commodity PDSc is con-
verted into the demand price of a domes-
tically produced commodity PDDc by in-
corporating domestic marketing and trade 
margins. These are calculated by multiply-
ing a commodity’s transactions cost share 
icdc′c by the market price at which the trans-
actions commodities are sold at PQc′. 
  The demand for a commodity can either 
be satisfied by domestic or foreign supply. 
The price of an imported commodity PMc, 
shown in equation (43), is equal to the com-
modity’s world import price pwmc multi-
plied by the exchange rate EXR and any im-
port tariffs tmc. Any additional transactions 
costs are added, and are equal to the share 
of these costs per commodity unit icmc mul-
tiplied by the market price of these trans-
action commodities PQc. 
  For those commodities that have both 
domestic and foreign supply, equations (44) 
and (45) represent the CES or Armington 
function determining the final quantity and 
price of imported QMc and domestically 
supplied QDc commodities. These two com-
modities are combined to form a composite 
commodity QQc that is then supplied to the 
market. The elasticity of substitution, which 
is a transformation of ρc
q, represents the ease 
at which consumers are willing to shift de-
mand between domestic and foreign prod-
ucts. Equation (46) applies only to those 
commodities that are solely imported or do-
mestically supplied. This replaces the Arm-
ington function and ensures that composite 
supply QQc is equal to either domestic QDc 
or foreign supply QMc. 
  Equation (47) is the total value of ab-
sorption, or alternatively, the total spending 
on a commodity at demander prices. The 
value of absorption is composed of the final 
composite commodity’s price exclusive of 
sales taxes PQc⋅(1 – tqc) multiplied by the 
quantity of the composite QQc. Except for 
those commodities that are solely exported, 
this value of absorption is equal to the sum 
of the value of domestic PDDc⋅QDc and 
foreign supply PMc⋅QMc. The composite 56   APPENDIX
commodity is supplied to the domestic mar-
ket and is purchased at market prices PQc 
to satisfy intermediate QINTc,a, household 
QHc,h, government QGc, and investment 
QINVc demand. 
  Transaction services have an additional 
component of demand generated through 
indirect demand for trade inputs during the 
import, export, and domestic sale of com-
modities (Equation 48). A fixed quantity of 
trade inputs are used per unit of the com-
modity being traded. These are shown in 
the equation as icmcc′ for imports, icecc′ for 
exports, and icdcc′ for domestically supplied 
commodities. These shares are multiplied 
by the quantity of the traded commodity in 
order to arrive at the total additional demand 
for transaction services QTc. 
  The final two production and price equa-
tions (49 and 50) calculate consumer and 
domestic price indices. The consumer price 
index CPI is equal to the weighted sum of 
the market price of each commodity PQc, 
where the weight cwtsc is the share of each 
commodity in the household consumption 
basket. Similarly, the domestic price index 
DPI is the domestic supply price PDSc 
weighted by the share of each commodity in 
total domestic supply dwtsc. The consumer 
price index is used as the numéraire in the 
model, and the domestic price index is used 
to derive the real exchange rate. The model 
i s  h o m o g e n eo u s  o f  d e gree  ze r o  in  p ri ce s , 
since a doubling of the numéraire will leave 
relative prices, and hence the real allocation 
of resources, unchanged.
  The equations have so far defined the 
production and price structure of the model. 
The next block of equations determines the 
generation of institutional incomes and how 
this in turn generates demand for commodi-
ties. The model distinguishes between a 
number of institutions including enterprises, 
households, and the government. Factor 
employment in the production process gen-
erates factor incomes as shown in equation 
(51). Total income for each factor, YF f, is 
equal to its economywide wage WF f multi-
plied by both the quantity employed QF fa in 
each activity and its sector-specific wage-
distortion term WFDISTfa. Factor incomes 
are then transferred to either domestic insti-
tutions or to the rest of the world. Equation 
(52) shows how foreign factor remittances 
measured in domestic prices trnsfrrow f⋅EXR 
are removed from factor incomes, before 
the remaining income is distributed across 
domestic institutions based on fixed shares 
shifif to arrive at a total value of factor in-
come for each institution YIFif. 
  Direct payments from factors YIF if only 
form part of the total income YIi earned 
by domestic nongovernment institutions. 
As shown in equation (53), other income 
sources include transfers received from other 
institutions TRIIii′, CPI-indexed transfers from 
the government trnsfri gov⋅CPI, and domes-
tically valued transfers from the rest of the 
world trnsfri row⋅EXR. Domestic nongovern-
ment institutions make transfers to other 
institutions (TRIIii′) in equation (54). For 
example, households make transfers to each 
other, and enterprises transfer dividend in-
come (or indirect capital income) to house-
holds. The value of these transfers is a fixed 
share shiiii′ of the institution’s income YIi′ 
after paying taxes tinsi′ and saving MPSi′. 
  Having determined households’ income, 
equation (55) calculates the amount of in-
come available for consumption spending, 
EHh. This amount is equal to total house-
hold income less payments for direct taxes 
tinsh, savings MPSh, and the share of in-
come transferred to other institutions shiiih. 
Households maximize a Stone–Geary utility 
function subject to a budget constraint. The 
resulting first-order condition is referred to 
as a linear expenditure system (LES) since 
spending on individual commodities QHch 
is a linear function of total spending EHh. 
Total household expenditure is distributed 
across commodities in equation (56). A por-
tion of consumption for each commodity, 
PQc⋅γch
m, is treated as independent of the 
level of disposable income available for con-
sumption spending. The remaining income 
is then distributed among commodities ac-
cording to fixed shares, βch
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ity is weakly separable since domestic and 
foreign commodities are imperfectly substi-
tutable. Together with the linear homogene-
ity of the LES demand system, this implies 
that the consumers’ decisions can be decom-
posed into “two-stage budgeting.” At the 
first stage, consumers maximize the Stone–
Geary utility function of composite com-
modities subject to a given level of income 
and composite prices. At the second stage, 
consumers maximize the subutility functions 
subject to the expenditure allocated to each 
commodity in the first decision stage.
 Fixed  investment  demand  QINVc across 
commodities is defined in equation (57) as 
the base-year quantity qinvc multiplied by 
an adjustment factor IADJ. By using an ad-
justment factor, which has a value of one in 
the base, the assumption is that the commod-
ity composition of the investment bundle 
remains unchanged as the level of invest-
ment adjusts. Another component of final 
demand is government consumption spend-
ing [equation (58)]. This quantity is treated 
in the same way as investment demand. 
Base-year government spending on com-
modities qgc is multiplied by an adjustment 
factor  GADJ to arrive at a final level of 
spending on each commodity QGc. The total 
value of total government spending EG is 
equal to the market value of government 
consumption spending PQc⋅QCc, as well as 
CPI-indexed transfers to other institutions 
trnsfrigov⋅CPI [Equation (59)]. Government 
expenditure is financed by government rev-
enue YG. As shown in equation (60), income 
sources include direct taxes tinsi, activity 
taxes taa, import tariffs tmc and tmrcr, sales 
taxes tqc, factor income YF govf, and transfers 
received from the rest of the world trnsfrgovrow. 
Depending on changes in government spend-
ing, changes in revenues and the deficit can 
therefore affect the level of investment or 
savings in the economy by influencing the 
availability of loanable funds. The extent to 
which this is possible depends on the adjust-
ment mechanisms in the economy. 
  The third block of equations describes 
system constraints and model closures. These 
equilibrium constraints embody assump-
tions or “closure rules” determining how the 
macro-economy and commodity and factor 
markets work. Equilibrium exists in the com-
modity market if total demand equals total 
supply for each commodity. Equation (61) 
shows how total supply for the composite 
commodity QQc has to equal the sum of 
intermediate demand QINTca, household con-
sumption  QHch, government consumption 
QGc, investment demand QINVc, changes in 
inventories qdstc, and the indirect demand 
for transactions services QTc. Inventory de-
mand is treated as exogenous in the model 
and remains fixed at base-year values. Fac-
tor market equilibrium, as shown in equa-
tion (62), implies that the sum of factor de-
mands across all activities QF fa must equal 
the total supply of that factor QFSf. Three 
closures are possible for each factor in the 
model: (1) factors are mobile across sectors 
but total supply is fixed; (2) factor supply is 
fixed and factors are immobile across sec-
tors; or (3) factor supply is perfectly elastic 
at a fixed real wage. In the Ugandan and 
Zambian models land and labor is assumed 
to be fully employed and mobile across sec-
tors. This allows for HIV/AIDS and rapid 
population growth to be incorporated, which 
are important for Zambia and Uganda re-
spectively. Capital supply is determined dy-
namically (described later) but is immobile 
across sectors within a given time period, 
thus reflecting short-run constraints.
  Macroeconomic closures affect the gov-
ernment balance, the current account balance, 
and the workings of savings and investment 
in the economy. The government balance is 
shown in equation (63). Here total govern-
ment income YG is equal to total govern-
ment spending EG and government savings 
GSAV. If the government budget is in defi-
cit, then the value of government savings is 
negative (that is, the government is borrow-
ing or dis-saving). Three variables embodied 
in the government account are relevant to its 
macroeconomic closure. These include gov-
ernment savings GSAV, the level of govern-
ment spending [GADJ from equation (58)], 58   APPENDIX
and the level of government income from 
the direct taxation of domestic institutions 
[TINSi from equations (54) and (55)]. One 
of these three variables must be held con-
stant for equation (63) to be defined. In the 
Ugandan and Zambian models the direct tax 
rates imposed on domestic nongovernment 
institutions are held fixed thus assuming that 
the government is constrained in raising 
taxes to cover additional public spending.
  The current account balance is defined 
in equation (64). The outflow of foreign 
currency is shown on the left hand side as 
the sum of import spending pwmc⋅QMc 
and transfers paid to the rest of the world 
trnsfrrow f, both of which are measured in 
foreign currency. In equilibrium, this out-
flow must be matched by an inflow of cur-
rency. Total inflows include earnings from 
exports pwec⋅QEc, transfers received from 
the rest of the world trnsfrir ow, and total 
foreign savings or borrowing FSAV. For 
current account equilibrium to be defined 
either the level of foreign borrowing FSAV 
or the exchange rate EXR must be held 
fixed. In the Ugandan and Zambian models, 
the level of foreign savings is fixed, thus 
assuming that the country cannot borrow to 
finance additional spending.
  The final macroeconomic account reflects 
the balance between savings and investment. 
In equation (65), total savings is the sum of 
private savings from post-tax disposable in-
come MPSi⋅(1 – TINSi)⋅YIi, government sav-
ings GSAV, and foreign savings EXR⋅FSAV. 
In equilibrium this must equal the combined 
value of fixed investment PQc⋅QINVc and 
inventory investment PQc⋅qdstc. Macro-
economic closure of this account implies that 
either investment is savings-driven (with MPSi 
fixed), or savings is investment-driven (with 
IADJ fixed). In the Ugandan and Zambian 
models, a savings-driven investment closure 
is adopted in which investment adjusts endog-
enously to the availability of loanable funds. 
Equation (66) shows how the saving rates of 
domestic nongovernment institutions MPSi 
are comprised of the base-year rate mpsi mul-
tiplied by a scaling factor MPSADJ. 
  The description so far has outlined a 
static version of the CGE model, while the 
remainder of this section describes the dy-
namic extension of the model. A number of 
exogenous and endogenous changes take place 
over time and are important for capturing the 
growth process. Together these changes form 
a projected or counterfactual growth path for 
the economy. These interperiod adjustments 
include population and labor force growth, 
capital accumulation, factor productivity 
changes, and changes in foreign capital in-
flows and government expenditure. 
  Population growth is assumed to enter 
the model through its direct and positive 
affect on the level of private consumption 
spending. As shown in equation (56), each 
representative household consumes com-
modities under a linear expenditure system 
(LES) of demand. This system allows for an 
income-independent level of consumption 
PQc⋅γ ch
m measured as the market value of 
each household’s consumption of each com-
modity that is unaffected by changes in dis-
posable income. The remaining terms in 
equation (56) determine the level of addi-
tional consumption demand that adjusts with 
changes in income. During the dynamic up-
dating process and as the population grows, 
the level of each household’s consumption of 
a particular commodity is adjusted upward 
to account for greater consumption demand. 
This adjustment is achieved by increasing 
the quantity of income-independent demand 
γch
m at the rate of population growth. 
  The method of updating the relevant pa-
rameters to reflect changes in land and labor 
supply in the current model depends on the 
factor market closure chosen. Since land and 
labor supply is fixed under full employment, 
total land and labor supply [QFSf in equa-
tion (62)] are adjusted upward each year in 
the Ugandan and Zambian models to reflect 
exogenously determined estimates of land 
and labor force growth. This specification 
allows for the effects of HIV/AIDS and other 
exogenous demographic factors to be taken 
into account, which the model would other-
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  Unlike labor supply, all changes in total 
capital supply are endogenous in the dynamic 
model. In a given time period the total avail-
able capital is determined by the previous 
period’s capital stock and investment spend-
ing. However, what remains to be decided 
is how the new capital stock resulting from 
previous investment is to be allocated across 
sectors. An extreme specification of the model 
would allocate investment in proportion to 
each sector’s share in aggregate capital in-
come or profits. However, in the current dy-
namic model, these proportions are adjusted 
by the ratio of each sector’s profit rate to the 
average profit rate for the economy as a whole. 
Sectors with a higher-than-average profit rate 
receive a larger share of investment than their 
share in aggregate profits. This updating pro-
cess involves four steps. 
  Equation (67) describes the first step at 
which the average economywide rental rate 
of capital AWF ft
a is calculated for time pe-
riod t. This rate is equal to the sum of the 
rental rates of each sector weighted by the 
sector’s share of total capital factor demand. 
In the second step, each sector’s share of the 
new capital investment ηa
fat is calculated by 
comparing its rental rate to the economy-
wide average. For those sectors with above 
average rental rates, the second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (68) will be greater 
than one. The converse would be true for 
sectors with rental rates that are below aver-
a g e .  Thi s  te rm  i s  th e n  m ul ti p li ed  b y  th e  
existing share of capital stock to arrive at a 
sectoral distribution for new capital. The in-
tersectoral mobility of investment is indi-
cated by βa. In the extreme case where βa 
is zero there is no intersectoral mobility of 
investment funds, and all investment can 
be thought of as being funded by retained 
profits. Equation (69) shows the third step of 
the updating procedure in which the quan-
tity of new capital is calculated as the value 
of gross fixed capital formation divided by 
the price of capital PKft. This quantity is 
t h e n  m u l t i p l i e d  b y  e a c h  s e c t o r ’ s  s h a r e  o f  
new capital ηa
fat to arrive at a final quantity 
allocated to each sector (∆Ka
fat). The deter-
mination of the unit capital price is shown 
in equation (70). In the final step the new 
aggregate quantity of capital QFSft+1 and the 
sectoral quantities of capital QFfat+1 are ad-
justed from their previous levels to include 
new additions to the capital stock. In addi-
tion to these changes, there is also a loss of 
capital to account for depreciation (υf). 
  Along with changes in factor supply, the 
dynamic model also considers changes in 
factor productivity. This is done by multi-
plying either the αa
va parameter in equation 
(27) by the percentage change in total factor 
productivity (TFP), or δva
fa in the case of 
factor-specific productivity. Finally, govern-
ment consumption spending and transfers to 
households, as well as foreign transfers, are 
fixed in real terms within a particular pe-
riod. It is necessary to exogenously increase 
these payments between periods. This is done 
by increasing the value of qgc in equation 
(58) for government consumption spending, 
trnsfrigov in equation (5 9) f or go v ernment 
transfers to households, and trnsfrir ow in 
equation (64) for foreign transfers.
  Finally, the model is linked to a house-
hold expenditure survey by taking endog-
enous changes in commodity consumption 
from each aggregate household and adjust-
ing the level of expenditure for the corre-
sponding disaggregated households in the 
survey. As the data used to calibrate the 
model (that is, social accounting matrix) are 
constructed using the survey data, there is 
a direct mapping between commodities and 
households in the model and survey. There-
fore changes in QHch from equation (56) 
(measured in base year prices) are used to 
update household expenditure in the survey. 
Standard poverty measures (including the 
poverty–growth elasticity) are then recalcu-
lated using the updated expenditure estimates 
and the unchanged poverty line.60
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